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This thesis looks at Kant’s question about the antagonism between free-
dom and determinism and how he tried to reconcile them through aesthetics. I 
begin the thesis by sketching the influences on Kant’s aesthetics, by looking at 
the problem that arose after he completed his first two critiques, and by defining 
his three faculties. From there I examine his four moments of beauty. Next, I ask 
how beauty symbolizes morality. In the conclusion I submit a possible answer 
how beauty can resolve the antagonism between freedom and determinism. The 
tentative answer is as follows. 
According to Kant, beauty doesn’t require us to look at a thing through de-
terminate concepts. In those moments we see a thing as an appearance and 
other than its appearance (as free). We then come closest to seeing a thing-in-
itself because we see the thing as other than its label—we see it as purposive-
ness and not as a purpose to be used. When Kant said beauty is a symbol of 
morality, perhaps he meant absolute freedom can’t have a direct representation 
outside of an aesthetic experience. If Kant is right that beauty bridges determin-
ism and freedom, Kant makes a case for beauty’s importance.    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PREFACE
How does Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) resolve the antagonism between 
freedom and determinism in his aesthetics? “Determinism” refers to the Newton-
ian laws of nature. “Freedom” refers to the moral law (or free will) within ethics. 
Another way of looking at these two terms is, freedom is the “ought” of ethics and 
determinism is the “is” of science. 
Kant gave a tentative answer to this question in his first two critiques. 
Within time, space, and the laws of nature, a thing appears as determined. But 
space and time prevent us from seeing the thing-in-itself as free. But this an-
swers the question in the negative: time and space belies freedom. Kant claims 
to give a positive answer in his third critique, The Critique of Judgment (1790). 
Frustratingly his answer isn’t clear. So, in this thesis I’d like to speculate what his 
answer may be. Here’s one possibility. And it’s the thesis’s argument.
The beautiful lets us see a thing without determining it with concepts. As a 
result, we come close to seeing a thing-in-itself (as free). In other words, in mo-
ments of beauty, a thing appears within the laws of nature (as phenomenon) yet 
also as “more than” its appearance (as noumenon). In the beautiful, we experi-
ence a thing as both phenomenon and noumenon. This is a paradox, true. But 
Kant will define beauty in four paradoxes. Underlying these paradoxes is a guid-
ing principle: “purposiveness.” Purposiveness senses a thing as appearance and 
freedom. Beauty, then, may be a symbol of morality because a truly good (free) 
will can’t have direct presentation, except indirectly. That’s beauty.    
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In Chapter 1 I’ll sketch the thinking about aesthetics that influenced Kant. 
In Chapter 2, I’ll sketch Kant’s driving question in the third critique. In Chapter 3, 
I’ll define his three faculties as his aesthetics depend on an understanding of 
these terms. In Chapter 4, I’ll delve into Kant’s four paradoxical moments of 
beauty. In Chapter 5, I’ll discuss how “the paradox of beauty” is a symbol of 
morality. Finally, in Chapter 6 I can develop the possibility that beauty solves the 
antagonism between determinism and freedom—as an object of beauty is free 
from concepts yet also appears within the sensible realm of determinable con-
cepts.
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CHAPTER 1.
INFLUENCES ON KANT’S AESTHETICS
CHAPTER 1: INFLUENCES ON KANT’S AESTHETICS 
Kant didn’t write in a vacuum. He synthesized ideas about beauty and art 
that were “in the air” during eighteenth-century Europe. But let me say this an-
other way. 
The Enlightenment was unique in history for how much brain-energy was 
spent thinking about aesthetic questions. Without those ideas, I’m not sure Kant’s 
aesthetics would have been. But if that’s true, where did Enlightenment thinkers 
get their ideas from? And what was it about this era that made these thinkers so 
preoccupied with aesthetic questions in the first place? We could trace the pre-
occupation back to René Descartes (1596-1650). 
A. Descartes’s Dualism
Now, it’s true Descartes may not have been interested in aesthetic issues 
per se. But his “new” philosophy brought up “new” questions about the nature of 
beauty and art. That is, Descartes saw mind and matter as distinct. That thought 
inspired new questions about art and beauty. How so? 
Descartes published Discourse on the Method in 1637 and Meditations in 
1640. If we look at Descartes’s life, we’ll see Europe was floundering in the 
bloodiest religious war of its history, the “Thirty Years War” (1618-1648) during 
 2
his entire adult life.  Descartes was 22 years old when the war began, and he 1
lived only 2 more years more after the war ended. 101 years after Martin Luther 
(1483-1546) nailed the 95 Theses on a church door in 1517, wars erupted be-
tween Catholic and Protestant states that resulted in 8 million deaths, spread of 
disease, outbreak of witch hunts.  Stephen Toulmin argues in Cosmopolis that 2
this may have been Descartes’s motive for wanting to lay a new foundation for 
knowledge—something more “certain” than religion. 
Descartes gave Europe hope. We can uncover universal truth, if we look 
for clear and distinct ideas. Let those be the ingredients of knowledge. Let what’s 
most fundamental, clear, evident—place those propositions at the foundation of 
knowledge, not what’s uncertain, unclear. But how can we find clear and distinct 
ideas? Descartes’s answer: apply the standards of arithmetic and geometry. Just 
like arithmetic and geometry, “clear and distinct” deductions would have universal 
application. Descartes’s method promised to uncover indubitable, universal truths
—true for everyone, everything, everyplace, everywhen. 
His ideal spread across Europe.  Many saw hope in replacing religious be3 -
lief and superstition with more “secure” knowledge. Not long after Descartes’s 
philosophy, witch hunts did end. But a problem arose. What place did this leave 
morality and aesthetics? Must these now be discarded as what’s less clear, dis-
 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 1
Chicago Press, 1990), 61.
 Wikipedia contributors, "Thirty Years' War," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://2
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Thirty_Years%27_War&oldid=749137774, accessed October 
8, 2016.
 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short 3
History (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1975), 141.
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tinct, objective, certain—as mere “subjectivity”? Many Enlightenment thinkers 
wanted to argue that morality and aesthetics can give us “truth” that’s as legiti-
mate (and objective) as ideas yielded from the Cartesian method. The first post-
Cartesian thinker to make such a case, especially for aesthetic judgments, was 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713). 
B. Empiricist vs. Rationalist Aesthetics
In the book Philosophies of Art & Beauty, Albert Hofstadter and Richard 
Kuhns wrote this about Shaftesbury: “It is probably no exaggeration to attribute to 
Shaftesbury the origin of all modern philosophies of art.”  In fact, we could say 4
two thinkers stand at the beginning of modern philosophical aesthetics: Shaftes-
bury in England and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) in Germany. 
Shaftesbury’s set of aesthetic issues would represent the “empirical” camp 
of aesthetics during the Enlightenment. In fact, John Locke advised Shaftesbury 
in his youth, though Shaftesbury would come to disagree with Locke’s philoso-
phy. Baumgarten’s set of issues would represent the “rational” camp of aesthet-
ics. He was a student of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who had systematized Got-
tfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646-1716) philosophy. Baumgarten built on Wolff and 
didn’t disagree with him the way Shaftesbury did with Locke. 
Instead, Shaftesbury took from neoplatonism and stoicism. His contribu-
tion to philosophy: all humans have a moral/aesthetic sense, a feeling that gives 
 Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, ed., Philosophies of Art & Beauty: Selected Read4 -
ings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), xvi.
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us objective judgments about these. British philosophers after Shaftesbury came 
up with different solutions to how a feeling can give us objective judgments about 
morals and aesthetics. 
Baumgarten’s set of issues, on the other hand, derive more from 
Descartes. He looked at what Descartes might call “lower” act of cognitions, i.e., 
sense perception. Baumgarten even gave this cognition a name: “aesthetics,” 
which is where we get the word from today. Baumgarten’s question: how are 
“truths” of poetry possible within a Cartesian framework? 
So, in a way both thinkers reacted to Descartes. But where Baumgarten 
worked within the Cartesian framework, Shaftesbury challenged it.
By the end of the 18th century, Kant synthesized both camps in his aes-
thetics.  He answered Shaftesbury’s question about how the aesthetic sense 5
might given us objective judgments about beauty using Baumgarten’s idea of 
sense-perception-as-an-act-of-cognition. Kant disagreed with Baumgarten that 
sense perception is a “confused” and so “lower” judgment. Instead, Kant saw 
aesthetic judgments as equal to logical judgments. But I’m getting ahead of my-
self. Before we dig into Kant’s synthesis of Shaftesbury and Baumgarten, let’s 
look at what their positions were—starting with Shaftesbury.
 Hannah Ginsborg, “Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso5 -
phy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-aesthetics, last revised February 13, 2013, 7.
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C. Shaftesbury (Empiricist)
1. A Non-Systematic Thinker
Shaftesbury wasn’t exactly a systematic thinker, but his three-volume book 
of essays called Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), influ-
enced British philosophers (like Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith), French thinkers 
(like Voltaire and Rousseau)  and of course Kant in Germany. His prestige de6 -
clined in the 20th century though, with the rise of analytic philosophy.  7
The reason is, Shaftesbury didn’t use numbered premises to deduce con-
clusions. He used literary rhetoric, metaphor, analogy, play, illustrations (he 
worked with hired artists to produce allegorical illustrations ), and essays. 20th 8
century analytic philosophers had trouble reading Shaftesbury, and dismissed 
him as literary rather than philosophical. Interestingly, Renaissance philosopher 
Michel de Montaigne relied on literary rhetoric in his essays, too. Although 
Descartes had a readable writing style, Descartes was similar to analytic 
philosophers in favoring a deductive style of doing philosophy. My only point is 
Shaftesbury seemed to do philosophy in the “old” Renaissance way rather than 
in the “new” Cartesian way.
Regardless, Shaftesbury wrote in different characters in Characteristics—
similar to how Kierkegaard wrote under pseudonyms. For example, Volume I 
consists of (1) “A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm”—a letter to a lord; and (2) 
 John McAteer, “The Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713),” Internet Encyclopedia of 6
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/shaftes/, accessed October 26, 2016, 1.
 Ibid.7
 Ibid., 3.8
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“Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor”—a letter to a 
friend. Volume II consists of (3) “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author”—an internal 
dialogue where Shaftesbury addresses himself; (4) “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue 
and Merit”—an ironic scholastic-style philosophy lecture; and (5) “The Moralists; 
a Philosophical Rhapsody”—a dialogue between Philocles and Theocles. The 
Moralists may arguably be the heart of the work. Volume III consists of “Five 
Miscellaneous Reflections on the Said Treatises, and Other Critical Subjects”—
Shaftesbury’s comments on the five essays, as if Shaftesbury the literary critic 
were in a dialogue with Shaftesbury the philosopher.  He began a second book 9
called Second Characters but didn’t live long enough to complete it. 
But his diversity of form and personae resisted a system.  This makes 10
sense. Shaftesbury in Soliloquy outright says, “The most ingenious way of be-
coming foolish, is by a System.”  11
Side note: my citations of Shaftesbury will refer to the online-accessible 
version of Den Uyl’s Liberty Fund edition. I will cite volume and original page 
number, followed by the name of essay with its part and section. For example, 
the citation will read something like, 1.290, Soliloquy, III.i. I hope this will make it 
easier to reference my citations if needed. 
In any event, why? Why did Shaftesbury resist systematic philosophy? 
 Ibid., 19.9
 Michael B. Gill, “Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury],” 10
Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shaftesbury/, accessed Octo-
ber 26, 2016, 3. 
 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opin11 -
ions, Times, ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 3 vols, http://oll.liberty-
fund.org/titles/1851; accessed November 7, 2016, 1.290, Soliloquy or Advice to an Author, III.ii.
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He thought the purpose of philosophy was to make us better people, to 
“improve” us.  But as long as “Empiricks and pedantik Sophits” did philosophy in 12
the Scholastic or Cartesian way, he thought philosophy would be imprisoned in 
“Colleges and Cells.”  Dry, lifeless texts that claim to have all the answers but 13
didn’t touch “Interest,” he thought, led to something worse than “Ignorance.” They 
would prevent us from actually developing wisdom and from actually living well.  14
Instead, what Shaftesbury was after was self-transformation, to turn our-
selves toward virtue. That’s why he took such pains to make his writing accessi-
ble to everyone—so he could touch people’s “Interest.” In fact, he used to read 
his writing aloud to see make sure it sounded  readable, engaging, conversa15 -
tional. And his thought is clear. In fact, the 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica says one reason Shaftesbury may have been popular in the 18th century 
was because of the “agreeable feeling” of his writing.  A 21st century reader can 16
still read his writing today with ease. So for Shaftesbury, he ditched analytic rigor 
so his philosophy could actually help readers live better lives, not so his reader 
could theorize about living better lives.17
 Ibid., 2.427, The Moralists, III.ii.12
 Ibid., 2.184, The Moralists, I.i.13
 Ibid., 1.290, Soliloquy, III.i.14
 McAteer,4-5.15
 Thomas Fowler, “Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of,” Online Encyclope16 -
dia, originally appearing in Volume 24, Page 763-5 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica, Cam-
bridge University Press, http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/SCY_SHA/SHAFTESBURY_ANTHO-
NYASHLEY_COOPE.html, accessed October 26, 2016.
 McAteer, 7.17
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2. An Anti-Cartesian Thinker 
Even though Shaftesbury is known today as the origin of modern aesthet-
ics, or as the philosopher who invented a link between aesthetics and ethics, he 
didn’t see himself as a pioneer. He seemed to see himself as defending a syn-
thesis that he thought already existed in classical philosophy.  In other words, he 18
saw the moral relativism in Hobbes and Locke as a threat, and used classical 
philosophy as a shield. This is ironic, especially since Shaftesbury began his life 
under Locke’s tutelage. 
John Locke (1632-1704) was close friends with Shaftesbury’s grandfather, 
the First Earl of Shaftesbury (1621-1683). In fact, Locke had treated a live infec-
tion of the First Earl’s in 1666, most likely saving his life.  So, the First Earl 19
(Shaftesbury’s grandfather) invited Locke to become his personal physician and 
secretary. Locke accepted. Locke would also go on to supervise the medical 
treatment for Shaftesbury’s father, the Second Earl’s (1652-1699) poor health. 
And Locke helped the Second Earl’s wife give birth to the Third Earl himself. But 
probably most significant, Locke supervised the eduction of the Third Earl. He 
selected Shaftesbury’s governess, Elizabeth Birch, and designed the curriculum 
for her to follow. There’s a good chance that Locke used that educational experi-
ment as the basis for his work Thoughts Concerning Education.  Through Birch, 20
 Ibid.18
 Wikipedia contributors, "Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury," Wikipedia, 19
The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Ashley_Cooper,_1st_Earl_ of_ 
Shaftesbury, accessed October 9, 2016.
 Ibid., 3.20
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Locke gave Shaftesbury a strong education in the classics. By age of 11, 
Shaftesbury was fluent in Greek and Latin. But again, the irony is Shaftesbury 
would eventually use that classical education against Locke’s philosophy. 
Shaftesbury gave modern philosophy this idea: ethics and aesthetics de-
rive from a “sentiment.” More specifically, he thought we humans are designed to 
appreciate order and harmony—and that appreciation is the basis of “objective” 
judgments of morality and beauty.  As I said, he saw himself as building on top 21
of Neoplatonism rather than innovating a “new” philosophy. 
He followed Plato and Neoplatonists (like Plotinus) in thinking that humans 
have knowledge of the beautiful and good embedded in our souls, even if it’s a 
shadow of absolute beauty and goodness. Shaftesbury used that idea to chal-
lenge Hobbes’s “the state of nature is a war of all against all” and Locke’s denial 
of innate ideas (which implies morality is relative, not natural or real). For 
Shaftesbury, we respond best to goodness, truth, and beauty.  So we naturally 22
desire society.
Though Shaftesbury disagreed with Locke, they remained friends. While 
Shaftesbury’s father was bedridden, Shaftesbury took over the family estate in 
1689 (he was only 18 years old) and Locke advised him in his new duties. Locke 
and Shaftesbury had philosophical conversations and kept in touch (some of 
 Gill, 1.21
 It’s no wonder 19th century German art historian Hermann Hettner wrote of Shaftes22 -
bury: “A new-born Hellenism, or divine cultus of beauty, presented itself before his inspired 
soul.” (encyc Brit, 1911). Shaftesbury seemingly desired to recover the spirit of Greek philosophy 
in this new Cartesian world.
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their correspondence is still preserved).  But ultimately, Shaftesbury took 23
Locke’s method of empiricism (observe sensory reality) in a different direction 
(moral beauty exists independent of human experience).24
In any event, Shaftesbury challenged four elements in Hobbes and Locke: 
empiricism, mechanism, voluntarism, and egoism. 
Empiricism rejected the innate ideas of morality. Mechanistic physics re-
jected purpose in nature. Voluntarism asserted universal moral principles are ac-
tually grounded in a sovereign will (i.e., in a social contract). Egoism reduced 
morality to self-interest—all human actions are selfish. But by postulating the ex-
istence of a moral and aesthetic sense, Shaftesbury argued morality a) isn’t mere 
self-interest, b) moral principles aren’t relative to a sovereign will, c) there is pur-
pose in nature (and the universe), and d) each of us is born with an inner sense 
of beauty and morality. 
His idea would influence Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson 
(1694-1746). Hutcheson would influence another Scottish philosopher, David 
Hume (1711-1776), who also thought morality should be based on sentiment, 
too. And of course Shaftesbury’s idea of an aesthetic sense would exert a major 
influence on Kant. Kant’s entire aesthetics is arguably an extension of Shaftes-
bury’s idea that every human is born with an aesthetic sense. 
 McAteer, 3-4.23
 Ibid., 2.24
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3. Shaftesbury’s Idea: Common Sense  
To repeat, Shaftesbury didn’t see aesthetics and morals as separate 
senses. He didn’t see one as an analogy for the other either. Instead, he saw 
beauty and goodness as “one and the same” sense.  In his essay Sensus 25
Communis, he calls this sense “common sense.” 
Here he probably followed Marcus Aurelius’s lead. Aurelius coined the 
term koinonoemosune to refer to our sense of the “common good.”  Shaftesbury 26
meant his “common sense” to be something similar, i.e., to harmonize with the 
good. When we apply common sense to human action, we call it “moral sense.” 
When we apply common sense to external objects (nature or art), we call it “aes-
thetic sense.”  But both are functions of the same sense.27
The underlying feature of common sense is the ability to judge immediate-
ly without reasoning. Judgments derive from our ability to sense harmony.  28
That’s why the word “sense” is so fitting—common sense responds immediately 
the way our bodily organ responds immediately.  As Shaftesbury puts it, com29 -
mon sense is like an external sensation where “straight an inward EYE distin-
guishes and sees the Fair…from the Deform’d.”30
 Shaftesbury, 2.399, The Moralists, III.ii.25
 McAteer, 12.26
 Beardsley, 179.27
 Ibid., 179-180.28
 Shaftesbury, 2.45, An Inquiry, 2.I.ii (Book 2, Part I, Section i).29
 Ibid., 2.415, The Moralists, III.ii. 30
 12
Though tempting to see common sense as an instinct (and Shaftesbury 
does call it an “instinct”), it may (possibly) be more accurate to call common 
sense an “innate potential.”  The reason is, Shaftesbury notes common sense 31
requires cultivation. Shaftesbury writes this in The Moralists, III.ii, “How long be-
fore a true taste is gained!” Every member of the human species is born with this 
potential, but we must learn how to use it through culture (or “education”).  Oth32 -
erwise, vice can cover over common sense.  That’s why Shaftesbury says his 33
philosophical aim is “to form within ourselves… relish,”  i.e., common sense.34
The guiding principle of common sense seems to be harmony.  Harmony 35
brings separate, diverse, conflicting parts into an ordered whole through form, 
design, number—like “Symmetry and Proportion.”  We see this principle in art, 36
in ethics, in nature. And so for Shaftesbury, harmony allows moral and aesthetic 
judgments not to be relative but universal.  How? 37
i. Nature as Organism (and Interconnected)
The short answer is, morality and beauty refer to Divine Mind’s handiwork 
(as “harmony”) running throughout nature. Common senses detects that harmo-
 McAteer, 16.31
 Ibid., 1.190, Soliloquy, I.iii.32
 Shaftesbury, 2.41, Inquiry, 1.III.i.33
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ny, and allows us in turn to imitate harmony in art, morals, and knowledge. An-
other way of saying this: morality and beauty rely on Shaftesbury’s vision of na-
ture as a concord of parts to form a whole.
a. Representative Beauty vs. Original Beauty
In The Moralists, Shaftesbury has Theocles (his spokesman) advise how 
to approach, say, a coin: “never admire the Representative Beauty, except for the 
sake of the Original; nor aim at other Enjoyment than of the rational kind.”  38
Here’s one possible translation of that sentence: “enjoy beauty in its original form 
rather than as its mere appearance.” 
Mere appearance here might refer to mere bodily pleasure. Gratification of 
sexual pleasure when seeing a beautiful human body might be an example. We 
use rather than relish. “Rational” beauty, though, might refer to relishing the de-
sign of the coin or the design of a beautiful human body. 
So, Theocles would observe we have an inclination to enjoy an object as 
representation, for use. For example, I may want to use the coin to buy stuff. But 
Theocles would advise us to also enjoy the coin for the sake of the original. That 
is, become aware of the design, the craftsmanship, the form. Then I’m no longer 
occupied by “my” interest to use it. My focus is less on “me.” It’s more on the 
“form” of the coin.
But when I do that, I’m in effect appreciating the mind that made the coin. 
This is crucial. The source of the coin’s beauty is the effect of mind on material. 
 Ibid., 2.221, Moralists, III, ii.38
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But Shaftesbury doesn’t stop there. When I become aware of what designed the 
mind that crafted the coin—Mind—I’m truly enjoying beauty for the sake of the 
Original rather than for its Representation.
Form underlying matter is the source of beauty, not matter. For example, 
when I see a woman of beauty walking down the street, I don’t respond to her 
blood, veins, saliva, i.e., her “matter.” I’m drawn to the form stamped on her mat-
ter.  The way Shaftesbury puts it, “The beautifying, not the beautified, is the real39 -
ly beautiful.”  Or, to take another example, when we admire Michelangelo’s 40
David, it’s not the marble we admire but the “design” impressed on the marble. 
Shaftesbury would go a step further: the ability to stamp harmony onto matter 
comes not from mind but from a higher place, Mind. We’re really admiring Mind.
Shaftesbury’s analogy of the coin reveals three kinds of beauty : a) Rep41 -
resentative Beauty (the coin itself), b) the Forming Power (the artist who formed 
the coin), and c) Mind (the source of the Forming Power of the artist). Likewise, 
Shaftesbury places all beauty into this tripartite hierarchy of forms.
b. Three Kinds of Forms
He calls the lowest forms “Dead Form.” Human-made artworks (music, art, 
poetry) and natural forms (animals, trees, river, sky, stars) belong here. They’re 
passive objects “which bear a fashion and are formed, whether by man or nature, 
 Ibid., 2.227, Moralists, III.ii.39
 Ibid., 2.226, Moralists, III.ii.40
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but have no forming power”  themselves. In other words, they’re “dead” because 42
these forms can’t make anything. Yes, spiders spin webs. But they do so from 
instinct rather than from looking inward toward Mind. 
He calls the second order “Forms which form.” Human minds belong here. 
He describes this second order as “forming forms… that is, which have intelli-
gence, action and operation.”  In other words, humans can make works of art 43
through harmony. And we might say humans make themselves through moral 
choices also by turning inward and using Mind’s principle of harmony as a guide. 
He calls the third order “The Supreme and Sovereign Beauty.” Divine Mind 
belongs here. Mind “forms not only such as we call mere forms but even the 
forms which form.”  In other words, Mind designed minds and the “dead forms” 44
of the natural world. Our common sense, then, is mind recognizing Mind.
c. The Three Forms are Interconnected
Now, “dead forms” aren’t separate from Sovereign Beauty. Beauty and 
goodness are absolute, real, one—Beauty, Truth, and Goodness are forms of 
The Supreme. In fact, Shaftesbury says as much in Miscellaneous Reflections: 
“what is BEAUTIFUL is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and 
proportionable, is TRUE; and what is at once both beautiful and true, is, of conse-
quence, agreeable and GOOD.”  That means humans don’t decide what’s good, 45
 Ibid., 2.227, Moralists, III.ii.42
 Ibid.43
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true or beautiful because the Beautiful, True, and Good refer to the ground from 
which everything springs and upon which everything stands. As Shaftesbury puts 
it, Mind is “the principle, source, and fountain of all beauty.”  Like Plotinus, 46
Shaftesbury saw the entire cosmos as a single, living organism infused by 
“Mind,”  consisting of interconnected systems. “Dead forms” aren’t separate 47
from Mind, and nothing is outside of Mind.
Following Plotinus, Mind emanates as light from a dimensionless point 
called “The One,” the center of all. As the dimensionless center of all, there is no 
outside vs. inside—until The One emanated Mind. The outermost edge of Mind’s 
light is Soul. Faces look outward from Soul as individual “souls.” Separation ap-
pears within time and space but when a soul turns inward, it sees the ground 
upon which all bodies have in common. The sensible world, then, is what is “out-
side,” and the “outside” (the sensible realm) still belongs to The One (or non-du-
ality). 
In any event, this organism image is important to Shaftesbury for another 
reason: it’s how he resists Hobbes and Locke. 
ii. Nature as Organism Resists Hobbes and Locke’s Relativism
We can see why Kant may have thought aesthetics might heal the dualism 
between freedom and determinism in Shaftesbury’s idea of the organism. Briefly, 
here’s Shaftesbury’s idea.
 Ibid.46
 McAteer, 10.47
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a. Nature is Non-Mechanical and Non-Warring
From the perspective of a mind, the cosmos looks like a bunch of random, 
disparate bits. But from the perspective of Mind, the cosmos is a harmonious 
whole. Mind stamps harmony (or order) upon matter, making it “beautiful and 
sublime.” 
If we were to put that idea in Kant’s terms then Mind is “free,” and its 
stamp upon matter—the “laws” of nature that matter abide by—is “determined.” 
But those are Kant’s terms. Here’s how Shaftesbury might put that idea. 
Without Mind, the natural world would be “dead,” a soulless machine, 
without purpose, without beauty, without the sublime.  With Mind the natural 48
world is alive, its disparate parts ordered by number, put together for a purpose— 
as Shaftesbury says “there must be somewhere a last or ultimate end in man.”  49
When we humans sense Mind’s work within nature (as “harmony”) we respond 
by saying it’s “beautiful and sublime.” In fact, we don’t even have to think about it. 
We respond immediately without logic or concepts. We just sense Mind (or pur-
pose) beneath representation, beneath appearance. The more we relish Mind’s 
handiwork in nature and in art (in art we sense a Mind because the artist is par-
ticipating in Mind), we turn more and more toward Mind—back to the original, 
back to reality. 
 Ibid.48
 Shaftesbury, Regimen, p. 48 as quoted by John McAteer in “The Third Earl of Shaftes49 -
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By the way, I just used the word “sublime.” This is another area Shaftes-
bury pioneered in philosophical aesthetics. He didn’t invent the term “sublime,” 
he borrowed it from “Longinus.”  50
I put Longinus in quotation marks because no one knows who really wrote 
the Roman book On The Sublime. The reference manuscript is a copy (the origi-
nal is lost) and the heading reads “Dionysius or Longinus.” Dionysius from Hali-
carnassus is unlikely the author because the style and content of his known 
works clash with this one.  Cassius Longinus (213-273 CE), a disciple of Ploti51 -
nus, may have written this, but there’s some indication the work was written ear-
lier in the first century CE, so Longinus as author is also up for debate. 
Regardless, On the Sublime discusses a style of writing and speaking that 
elevates our thoughts and stirs our passions. Poet Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux 
(1636-1711) had translated On the Sublime for European audiences for the first 
time in 1674, and gave the concept a boost.  Shaftesbury’s “innovation” was to 52
apply “the sublime” concept (originally meant for “poetics”) to nature. For exam-
ple, check out this passage from The Moralists III.ii: 
Even the rude rocks, the mossy caverns, the irregular unwrought grottos 
and broken falls of waters, with all the horrid graces of the wilderness it-
self… will be the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence beyond 
the formal Mockery of princely Gardens.  53
 Beardsley, 181.50
 Wikipedia contributors, "Longinus (literature)," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclope51 -
dia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Longinus_(literature)&oldid=738042286, 
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In other words, nature in its ruggedness (the sublime) can be as effective in turn-
ing us toward Mind as nature in its softness (the beautiful). Kant followed 
Shaftesbury’s trail and thought the sublime could teach us to feel selfless plea-
sure as much as beauty can. Both lead us back to Mind.
b. Instead, Nature has a Harmonious Order
Rather than a mindless machine, a “mere body, a mass of modified 
matter,”  Shaftesbury saw nature as an organism with structure. That structure 54
comes from Mind. This idea flies in the faces of Hobbes and Locke. 
For if nature were merely mechanistic (without Soul and Mind), it would be 
useful to exploit, but not necessarily beautiful. On the other hand, when we see 
nature as alive like an organism (as having Mind, Soul, purpose), nature be-
comes beautiful—not a thing to manipulate. For example, in Part III of The Moral-
ists, section ii, Shaftesbury has Theocles give this analogy: 
Imagine then, good Philocles, if being taken with the beauty of the ocean, 
which you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to 
seek how to command it, and, like some mighty admiral, ride master of 
the sea, would not the fancy be a little absurd? . . . You will own the en-
joyment of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally 
follow from the contemplation of the ocean’s beauty.55
When we seek to “command” nature, we enjoy it as “representational beauty,” as 
something to be used. But when we “relish” nature, not as an object to be used 
(or mastered) but as an “organism” to be appreciated, we enjoy it for the “sake of 
the original.” We might even say we find ourselves in a “harmonious” relationship 
 Ibid., 2.199, Moralists, III.i.54
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with nature, too. Again, in contemplating nature’s beauty, we see a connection 
between the aesthetic sense and the moral sense. 
The organism model of nature is important for another reason. It implies 
nature has a moral order, i.e., systems within nature depend on each other rather 
than war against each other. In fact, Shaftesbury describes the cosmos as an 
ever-widening system of interconnectedness. 
First, Shaftesbury defines what he means by system. He says, “Whatever 
things have order, the same have unity of design and concur in one, are parts 
constituent of one whole or are, in themselves, entire systems.”  In other words, 56
a system is an order of parts that fit together for a purpose. Parts aren’t “inde-
pendent”  in a system but have “relation to the whole.”  57 58
Likewise, the state of nature isn’t to be in war but to be in harmony. Parts 
of a system must work together, or a system won’t work. We can see this inter-
connection of parts, says Shaftesbury, in a “dissected animal, plant, flower.”  So 59
in nature, everywhere we see a “mutual Dependency of Things.”  And that im60 -
plies nature has a kind of inherent moral order. 
Shaftesbury would say cells don’t act like Hobbes’s separate, self-suffi-
cient billiard balls in a “war of all against all.” Cells come together to form tissues. 
Tissues form organs. Organs form a system, for example the digestive system. 
 Shaftesbury, 2.161, Moralists, II.iv.56
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Systems interact with other systems for a “common good” (purpose). The ner-
vous system, muscular system, and skeletal system must work together so a 
person can walk down a street. Cells, then, (at least for Shaftesbury) depend on 
each other for a “common good.” Otherwise an organism won’t be able to func-
tion. Like Aristotle’s idea that all nature is directed to some good, Shaftesbury 
saw nature not as in war but in a “symbiosis” (or harmony) between different 
“Systems” for a purpose (or telos). 
Second, after Shaftesbury defines what he means by a system, he ob-
serves not only is an individual organism internally united, but so are organisms 
externally united to each other.  For example, humans depend on species of 61
plants and animals for survival just as “the spider (depends on) that of the fly.”  62
Ever-widening systems don’t stop there. Human individuals form a system called 
a community and a human individual can’t function without it. Next, all human 
communities form the human species. Every species on planet Earth fits into the 
ecosystem of Earth. Earth is one system of many in the larger order of the uni-
verse as a whole. And so, according to Shaftesbury, “All things in this World are 
united.”63
Third, after Shaftesbury shows how interconnected everything in the uni-
verse is through “harmony,” he draws out the moral implications of nature as or-
ganism. 
 McAteer, 10.61
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c. Therefore, Morality and Aesthetics are Real
If I were to formulate his argument, it might look something like this. Un-
derlying this ever-widening system of interconnectedness is harmony, not war. 
The reason there’s order and harmony is because nature is infused by Mind’s 
handicraft that has a higher purpose. Therefore, there’s real, non-relativistic 
ethics and aesthetics within the natural order. For him ethics and aesthetics 
means to abide by the “harmony” imbued in the natural world. A subjective failure 
to make moral and aesthetic judgments according to this universally real value 
doesn’t diminish its truth.  64
iii. Common Sense Detects this Reality
What allows humans to sense Mind behind appearances? The “forming 
power” of our mind participates in the Forming Power of Mind. Like recognizes 
like. Our minds may be limited by the sensible realm, but our forming power 
that’s like Mind’s enables us to recognize Mind in its handiwork (“harmony”), even 
if we only see Mind’s handiwork, not Mind itself. When we detect the “harmony” 
inherent in the natural order we can then also imitate it in our art, in our 
morality,  and in our “scientific” inquires.65
 McAteer, 12.64
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a. Aesthetic Sense
As for the aesthetic function, Shaftesbury says we can tell the difference 
between a church and a “heap of sand and stones.”  There’s a “sense of order 66
and proportion . . . imprinted on our minds”  and “interwoven in our souls”  so 67 68
we know order immediately “by a plain, internal Sensation” —without delibera69 -
tion. This ability to detect harmony is innate in every human person. Again, the 
proviso is every person must learn how to use it, or we can lose the capacity.70
One way to develop our capacity is to relish nature and artworks. That 
process can draw us closer to the Mind. In the process we approach nature as 
an “end” rather than as a “means.” 
We also have the ability to make, i.e., impress harmony and ideas on stuff. 
But here’s the proviso. Shaftesbury warns (following Aristotle) when an artist “fol-
lows Nature too close, and strictly copies Life” he is “unnatural.”  Art can’t be 71
blind mimicry or else Plato’s criticism of art would hold weight. Artists must have 
an “idea,” “invention and design.”  Ideas come from Mind. And so, even though 72
 Ibid., 2.161, Moralists, II.iv.66
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art is “artificial,” with Mind, art can still teach us “the nature of mankind” better 
than mere factual histories.73
b. Moral Sense
We’re often faced with choices between “private good” and “real good.” In 
An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, Shaftesbury defines private good as “self-interest” 
and real good as what harmonizes with “the Good of the General System,”  i.e., 74
the “common good” of a species. 
Pursuing private good doesn’t make us selfish. It’s necessary to be selfish 
at times, to take care of the self. But when our private good becomes so “immod-
erate” that we detach ourselves from the system, we become selfish. The “hu-
man system” means society or even the whole species. If a person “points be-
yond himself” as a distinct “part” relating  “to some other Being or Nature besides 
his own,” he will be part of the System,  and moral. 75
Common sense can help rein immoderate selfishness. It tells us what’s 
moral, what the common good is. Not all of us listen to this quiet voice. When we 
do, sometimes we do it out of self-interest, to get applause or to avoid punish-
ment. So, Shaftesbury says we must reflect on what action common sense de-
termines for us. If our sentiment responds with “affection” to the greater good, 
we’re motivated to do the right thing—not from private good alone (i.e., for a re-
 Ibid., 2.91, Sensis Communis, IV.iii.73
 Ibid., 2.11, Inquiry, 1.II.i.74
 Ibid., 2.10, Inquiry, 1.II.i.75
 25
ward) but for the real good. In the process we become truly virtuous because we 
want to do the right thing for the sake of it being good in itself.
Also, when we turn inward we find conflict in our thinking, in our passions, 
in our pleasures. We can heal those antagonisms through a method Shaftesbury 
calls “soliloquy.” In soliloquy, we divide ourselves into “two distinct Persons”  and 76
engage in an internal dialectic between them. This helps us find a consensus, 
unity, harmony within. By seeking harmony within, common sense guides us in 
knowing ourselves, not in a Scholastic way, but really knowing ourselves.
c. Inquiring Sense
Shaftesbury doesn’t discuss scientific inquiry as much, but he recognizes 
order, number, and harmony in the sensible realm. So, by examining that lan-
guage which Mind has written the cosmos in, i.e., number, we can discover its 
laws and how it works. We may never know the why, i.e., Mind’s highest aim. But 
we can study the natural world’s systems, its systematic “mechanisms,” its order, 
and in a Pythagorean spirit, bring order to our own souls and bring us closer to 
Mind. 
***
Again, though common sense is innate in every human, we must develop 
it. By doing so, we become more human and draw closer to the Original, to Reali-
ty, to The One.  We turn ever more inward from attachment to Representation 
back to Reality. And we can avoid Locke and Hobbes’s dangers of remaining 
 Ibid., 2.100, Soliloquy, I.i.76
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stuck in the outward world of self-interest. In Shaftesbury’s view, aesthetics and 
moral judgments are subjective and objective because Mind runs throughout na-
ture. And subjective mind is linked with Mind. 
4. Kant’s Takeaway
Kant seems to take three big ideas from Shaftesbury. a) There’s a connec-
tion between morality and aesthetics. b) In beauty we see an ordered whole 
freely created by Mind yet we also see an ordered System that has a kind of de-
terminism. c) Common sense unifies knowledge, morality, and creation. But 
where Shaftesbury links common sense with Mind, Kant finds another answer.
D. After Shaftesbury: Three Empiricist Camps
After Shaftesbury, British philosophers of taste divided into three camps:  77
(a) internal-sense theories including Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson 
(1694-1746), David Hume (1711-1776), Thomas Reid (1710-1796), William Hog-
arth (1697-1764); (b) imagination theories including Joseph Addison 
(1672-1719), Edmund Burke (1729-1797); c) association theories including 
David Hartley (1705-1757), Alexander Gerard (1728-1795), Archibald Alison 
(1757-1839), Joseph Priestly (1733-1804). Briefly here’s how philosophers tried 
to solve Shaftesbury’s problem without using Mind. Kant will build on them.
 James Shelley, “18th Century British Aesthetics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 77
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-british, accessed October 18, 2016.
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1. Internal-Sense Theorists
Shaftesbury held the first “internal sense theory.” As we saw, he thought 
judgments of beauty arise immediately like a “sense” organ. Also, the form under-
lying sensible material is what makes an object beautiful, not the sensible mater-
ial itself.  Hutcheson takes Mind out of Shaftesbury’s theory but still argues 78
beauty depends on Mathematical theorems (forms),  rather than sensible mat79 -
ter.
2. Imagination Theorists  
Imagination theorists held the opposite view. Addison founded this theory 
in 1712, a year after Shaftesbury’s Characteristics came out in 1711. It’s not clear 
whether Addison was reacting against Shaftesbury (he doesn’t engage Shaftes-
bury), but he seems to assume him because he denies an internal-sense. Addi-
son argues instead that the pleasure of beauty comes from the imagination. 
Imagination is the faculty of representation—it represents things to us vi-
sually, in images.  This means beauty is dependent not on form but on sensible 80
objects. It’s the exact opposite view to Shaftesbury. Pleasure comes not from our 
mind but from the sensible world.  81
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Burke expands Addison’s idea to say imagination represents not just vis-
ual images to us but also sounds, tastes, smells, and feelings.  In either case, 82
Addison at one point concludes “there is not perhaps any real beauty,” as all 
creatures capable of visual representation (or imagination) may be able to feel 
pleasure.  83
3. Association Theorists
Association theorists seem to have attempted to heal the dispute between 
internal-sense theorists and imagination theorists.  84
Gerard advanced a version of the theory in his 1759 Essay on Taste. He 
argued judgments of beauty are pleasurable by association. That is, we go 
through a mental process when we judge an object of beauty. We then transfer a 
pleasurable (or painful) mental process to the object.  That means an object 85
doesn’t have the property of beauty. We just associate a pleasurable (or painful) 
mental process with an object. Gerard goes a step further in defining what kind of 
mental process gives aesthetic pleasure. 
When we overcome a mental difficulty, we feel pleasure. Our mind is chal-
lenged, “puts forth its strength in order to surmount any difficulty”  but succeeds 86
in surmounting that difficulty. When we do, we feel pleasure and associate it with 
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the object that had required us to endure that difficult mental process. The idea 
is, aesthetic pleasure comes from mental processes that are difficult, but not so 
difficult as to prevent success.  87
Gerard thinks novel objects give us pleasure for this reason: they’re unfa-
miliar enough to make their judgment difficult enough.  Sublime objects give us 88
pleasure because their size makes conception of them just difficult enough.  Imi89 -
tations that resemble originals make judgments of them just difficult enough. And 
the humorous has dissonance and inconsistency that makes conception of this 
just difficult enough.  Gerard even lists (in the essay’s first pages) a scientific 90
discovery and a philosophical theory as being objects of taste as much as a 
poem and a painting.  91
So, aesthetic pleasure is neither only intellectual nor only material but a bit 
of both.  But the risk is, association theory also implies beauty might not be real, 92
as beauty relies on a person’s particular mental process. So, their view of beauty 
is also potentially relativistic.
***
Kant wants to support the internal-sense theory that says there is a real, 
non-relativistic standard of beauty. So, he will follow Shaftesbury to argue “form” 
 Gerard, 3-4 as cited by Guyer on pg. 13.87
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underlying matter gives a thing its beauty, and that each of us is born with a 
common sense. But Kant doesn’t rely on Shaftesbury’s idea of Mind to say beau-
ty is real and objective. He turns instead to the rationalist camp of aesthetics in 
Germany—especially to Baumgarten. 
E. Baumgarten (Rationalist)
1. Baumgarten’s Three Works  
Baumgarten was born in Berlin, 10 years before Kant. He was 2 years old 
when Leibniz died in 1716. Baumgarten was orphaned at age 8 and actually lived 
in an orphanage until he followed his brother (Jacob Sigismund, who became a 
prominent theologian himself) to Halle at 13. In 1730 at the age of 16 he entered 
university.  And by the time he was 21 (in 1735), he coined the term “aesthetics” 93
in his thesis, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus 
(“Philosophical meditations pertaining to some matters concerning poetry”).  94
He published his Metaphysics in 1739, and his Ethics in 1740. Interesting-
ly, Kant used both textbooks in his own classes on metaphysics and ethics. In 
1750, Baumgarten published volume 1 of Aesthetica, and volume 2 in 1758. 
Those 2 volumes had only covered a third of his original plan. He didn’t live long 
enough to execute the rest. Some speculate, though, that what he published may 
have covered the most original part of his plan.
 Paul Guyer, “18th Century German Aesthetics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, 93
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2. Baumgarten’s Idea: Studying Sense Perception
Here’s the idea Kant used of Baumgarten’s. We can see Baumgarten’s 
idea develop in three phases. 
First, in his 1735 thesis, Baumgarten argued poetry had a different truth 
than logical truth—he thought “poetic” kinds of truths needed a field of inquiry. 
Second, in his 1739 Metaphysics, Baumgarten argued sense perception is a 
cognition, independent from but parallel to logical cognition. Third, in his 1750 
Aesthetica, Baumgarten argued beauty perfects our (internal) senses, and 
doesn’t depend on the content of (external) representations. 
It’s this idea of a sensing, feeling cognitive power (independent from logi-
cal cognition) that Kant will use to argue beauty is universal. Let me dig into each 
of those phases a little deeper, because it will help us see where Kant got his an-
swer to Shaftesbury’s problem.
3. Working Within Leibniz and Wolff’s Framework
Baumgarten had a connection with Leibniz through Wolff. Unlike Shaftes-
bury, Baumgarten didn’t oppose his “teacher” (in this case Leibniz through Wolff) 
but developed his ideas within Leibniz’s philosophy of monads—Wolff had sys-
temized Leibniz’s ideas.  In fact, a major theme in Wolff’s philosophy was Leib95 -
niz’s “law of non-contradiction.”  96
 Thomas Mautner, Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition (London: Penguin Group, 95
2005), 659.
 New World Encyclopedia contributors, "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," New World 96
Encyclopedia, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Alexander_Got-
tlieb_Baumgarten&oldid=994347, accessed November 9, 2016.
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Wolff thought all truths are based on the premise that a proposition can’t 
be both A and not A.  He proceeded to reduce as many things to this consisten97 -
cy vs. inconsistency principle as possible. When Wolff came to the ideas we get 
from sensation, he found them obscure, because they’re neither clear nor dis-
tinct. Only ideas from logical refinement (such as from the law of non-contradic-
tion) can give us clear content. Following Descartes then, Wolff thought logic can 
arrive at “clear and distinct” ideas better than our senses. This is one of the core 
ideas of rationalism: the process of logical philosophy opposes sense perception. 
British empiricists, on the other hand, thought ideas arise originally from sense 
perception. 
4. Three Phases of Baumgarten’s Idea
i. 1735: The Truths of Poetry
Baumgarten assumed Wolff’s rationalism, but there was a question about 
sense perception that bothered him: how did the “truths” of poetry fit into the ra-
tionalist quest for “clear and distinct” ideas? 
Now, we often repeat Descartes’s phrase “clear and distinct” as a single 
idiom, but that’s not how Descartes saw it. In Principles of Philosophy, he defined 
“clear” as “present and apparent," and he defined distinct as “precise.”  98
 Ibid.97
 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. John Veitch (Produced by Steve Har98 -
ris, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team) http://www.fullbooks.com/The-
Principles-of-Philosophy1.html, originally published in 1644, Part I, xlv-xlvi.
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So, to take an example, a sharp pain can be clear but not distinct as long 
as we don’t know yet where the source of the pain is.  Leibniz expanded on 99
Descartes’s definition: we can have “clear vs. obscure” ideas and “distinct vs. 
confused” ideas.  In obscure ideas, the meaning is hazy, vague, hidden, un100 -
clear. In confused ideas, ideas aren’t distinct from each other. For example, if I 
can’t explain why I dislike a painting, I may have a clear idea that I dislike it, but 
my reasons why I think so may not be distinct yet.  It’s in that example from 101
Discourse on Metaphysics where Leibniz coined the phrase “je ne sais quoi” (“I 
know not what”). So, the context in which he coined that phrase was a discussion 
about confused ideas: when a person is unable to explain why he dislikes a 
painting. And the phrase became familiar in later debates about taste.  In “I 102
know not what,” those ideas aren’t distinct, but confused and jumbled. 
So, the rationalists saw sense perception as confused, because it gives us 
non-distinct ideas. As Leibniz would put it, the roar of the sea is a mass of little 
sounds, some below the threshold of hearing. In addition, we might say the sea 
also has a mass of colors and smells.  Those ideas aren’t distinct, but con103 -
fused. Sense perception, then, is a lower form of knowledge because by its na-
 Ibid.99
 Beardsley, 157-8.100
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, xxiv (1684) as quoted by 101
Beardsley, p. 158 in note 6. 
 Beardsley, 158.102
 Ibid.103
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ture it’s confused. Thankfully, logic allows us to distinguish these confused ideas 
from sense perception so that we can gain knowledge about an object.  104
Baumgarten’s point in his thesis was this. Artworks make ideas clear, but 
in a different way than the methods a mathematician gains clarity. For example, 
two poems might convey a message about falling in love. Yet one poem gets that 
idea across more clearly (and forcefully) than the other. The poet who’s able to 
get his idea across clearly uses a different set of rules than the mathematician 
who employs logical analysis. Baumgarten calls the kind of clarity logical analysis 
gets to as “intensive clarity.” The kind of clarity great poetic writing gets to, on the 
other hand, is “extensive clarity.”  So, good poetry is clear (not obscure) and 105
bad poetry is obscure. 
But Baumgarten agrees with Leibniz that poetry gives us confused (not 
distinct) ideas. The reason is, poetry relies on sensation. Sensation perception 
always has a mass of undistinguished ideas. That’s exactly why Baumgarten 
called poetry’s clarity “extensive.” “Extensive” means conveying emotions, ideas, 
sensations, images. But we want this in poetry. We don’t want to separate out 
those ideas into neat, logical boxes. Otherwise, a poem would cease to be poet-
ry. It would be logical discourse.  106
It’s in this very context Baumgarten introduces the word “aesthetics” for 
the first time. Here’s the sentence in which he does so: 
 Ibid.104
 New World Encyclopedia.105
 Guyer, 13.106
 35
The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have always carefully 
distinguished between the aistheta and the noeta . . . What can be cog-
nized through the higher faculty (of the mind are) the objects of logic, the 
aistheta are the subject of the epitome aisthetike or AESTHETICS (i.e., 
the science of sense perception). (Meditationes, CXVI, p. 86)  107
Once again, his idea is through sense perception (aesthetics), poetry conveys 
truth through “extensive clarity.” So, Baumgarten turns what would be a vice for 
science (confused ideas), into a virtue for poetry. 
This is an idea barely hinted at by Wolff.  But despite its originality, the 108
idea doesn’t challenge Wolff’s framework but fits within it.  
ii. 1739: Aesthetic Judgment is an Analogue of Reason   
Four years after his thesis, Baumgarten began to depart from Wolff in a 
subtle way. In his chapter titled “Empirical Psychology” of his 1739 Metaphysics, 
Baumgarten defines “judgment.” His definition: judgment decides between per-
fection or imperfection. He then divides judgment into two branches: “practical” 
judgment and “theoretical” judgment. 
Practical judgment is of “things foreseen.” Theoretical judgment concerns 
everything else. 
Next, he further divides theoretical judgment into two: that which is “dis-
tinct” (or logical) and that which is “sensible” (and confused). He calls sensible 
judgment “aesthetic judgment.” In other words, the ability to decipher perfection 
from imperfection through the senses (not the intellect) is aesthetic judgment. 
 As quoted in Guyer, 13.107
 Guyer, 13.108
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Finally, he divides aesthetic judgment into two: “intuitive” and “symbolic.” 
Intuitive aesthetic judgements judge sensible properties directly. Symbolic aes-
thetic judgments judge sensible properties indirectly. 
He then deduces a definition of beauty. Beauty is a judgment of perfection 
perceived by the senses, not the intellect.  109
But here’s his real departure from Wolff.
He calls the aesthetic judgment analogon rationis, “the analogue of rea-
son.” This is something Wolff wouldn’t have ever argued. For Wolff, sensory per-
ception was lower than reason. But Baumgarten thought the broad range of our 
dealings with sensory representations is not inferior to reason and logical analy-
sis. It’s something parallel to reason. More, the complex of powers within aesthet-
ic judgment such as when we see a sensible representation of perfection pro-
duces pleasure in us.  110
We’re a step away from Kant’s concept of “free play” of our mental pow-
ers. And I’m not sure if Kant would have gotten to this idea without this shoulder 
called “Baumgarten’s idea of analogon rationis” to stand on. 
iii. 1750: Beauty is Cognition without Content
In his last work, Aesthetica, Baumgarten begins to move even further 
away from Wolff. He dug deeper into this idea that sensory perception is inde-
 Ibid., 14.109
 Ibid., 14-5.110
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pendent of reason and possibly its “parallel.” Baumgarten begins that book with 
his famous definition of aesthetics as “the science of sensible cognition.”  111
What’s fascinating about the original definition of aesthetics is Baumgarten 
probably didn’t intend this field to be only the study of beauty and art. He seems 
to have envisioned aesthetics to be broader—to study sensible cognition in gen-
eral. But again in this work, he departs from Wolff’s philosophy even more, 
specifically from Wolff’s formulation of beauty. 
Wolff thought beauty was the sensitive cognition of perfection. Baum-
garten didn’t necessarily disagree, but he added to it. Baumgarten thought beau-
ty perfects our sensitive cognition. Again, the departure is subtle. 
Wolff’s formulation seems to be that beauty lies in the external representa-
tion of a sensible object. Here Baumgarten seems to internalize the experience 
of beauty. Beauty now is a pleasure we feel in our mental powers.112
In other words, the form and content of a sensible object can please our 
aesthetic judgment. But there’s a problem. The content can also please our theo-
retical and practical judgments, too. For example, moral content in a novel can 
delight both our sensible cognition and appeal to our practical judgment. So 
here’s Baumgarten’s radical idea. Aesthetic judgment can respond to an object 
without content. 
 Ibid., 15.111
 Ibid., 16.112
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That idea will be critical for Kant’s solution to Shaftesbury’s problem of 
how judgments of beauty can be both subjective (pleasurable) and objective 
(real, universal, non-relative).   
5. Kant’s Takeaway
Kant takes Shaftesbury’s idea of an innate aesthetic sense. Like British 
philosophers after Shaftesbury, Kant asks, how can a subjective judgment of 
beauty be objective? Rather than argue Mind is what makes an object beautiful, 
Kant uses Baumgarten’s idea of an analogon rationis. For Kant, the process of 
judging a beautiful object, then, is similar to arriving at logical truth. The differ-
ence is, in an aesthetic judgment, we gain no knowledge.  
But why take up Shaftesbury’s question about common sense at all? Why 
attempt to answer this British question of subjective-yet-objective beauty? 
Kant faced a gulf in his philosophy after he completed his first two cri-
tiques, and he wanted to bridge it. He may have thought Shaftesbury’s ideas 
about beauty as a “bounded whole” might be a way out. Perhaps Shaftesbury’s 
“aesthetic sense” showed a way to awaken the moral law within and also relish 
the starry skies above.
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CHAPTER 2.
KANT’S PROBLEM AFTER THE FIRST TWO CRITIQUES
CHAPTER 2: KANT’S PROBLEM AFTER THE FIRST TWO CRITIQUES  
In this chapter, let’s discuss the abyss that opened in Kant’s philosophy 
after he completed his first two critiques. 
His first critique represented knowledge and nature, his second critique 
represented ethics and free will. But now the two issues began to seem irrecon-
cilable. Was there a way to bring the two together, to bridge nature and free will? 
To get more specific, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant showed that we 
can know the laws of nature and its laws through the a priori principles of “under-
standing.” In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant showed that we can find the 
moral law in the Subject through the a priori principles of “reason.” But now one 
legislation ruled nature through understanding, and another legislation ruled 
freedom (the “inner” world) through reason. Understanding (the faculty for knowl-
edge) and reason (the faculty for ethics) were cut off from each other, unable to 
interact. Kant wanted to see if he could bridge the gulf between understanding 
and reason so they can reciprocally influence each other. 
Let me put that another way.
As long as we stick to experience, there’s no proof of freedom. We see 
cause and effect. If a door opens, we explain it by saying something caused it to 
open. There’s no free will there. Kant agreed that the world is determined by the 
mechanical laws of nature. But if that were the full story, we would never have to 
take responsibility for our actions. We could blame our circumstances or our 
 40
“genes.” We wouldn’t have to bother striving to do the right thing because nature 
(or even nurture) “made me do it.” Kant needed a way to preserve the possibility 
that we’re also free enough to abide by the moral law.
He observed that we have a power in our minds to see the whole. We can 
never actually see the whole because it’s beyond our experience. But that power, 
which he called “reason,” can come up with “ideas” about the whole like freedom. 
Kant argued we can believe in the idea of freedom (though there’s no proof of it) 
because it’s beyond the limitations of science to claim as fact it exists or doesn’t. 
Moreover, the idea also allows us to have faith that there’s a meaning to life, it 
allows us to act morally, and it allows us to take responsibility for our actions. 
But now we have a dualism in our thinking. We have a “belief” on one 
hand about freedom and the “facts” about determinism on the other. Is there a 
way to bridge these two ways of thinking together? That is, is there any way to 
give “belief” in freedom a concrete grounding? On the other side, is there a way 
to show a way out of the deadening kind of thinking that only sees a world of 
facts and determined natural laws?
There’s a second dualism Kant seems to want to bridge. In addition to a 
dualism in our thinking, there was also a dualism in the way Kant talked about 
objects “out there” in the world. Kant said objects appear to us in the determined 
realm of experience as “phenomena.” Phenomena “appear” to us within time and 
space. But Kant also spoke about an object being a thing-in-itself as “noumena.” 
A noumenon doesn’t exist within time and space, so it can never be known, but is 
somehow the source of a phenomenon. If that’s the case, why even posit a thing-
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in-itself? Is there any proof that an object is determined as phenomenon but also 
is free as noumenon? Or is this “thing-in-itself” just an abstract idea without any 
grounding? 
So, Kant’s aim in the third critique is to bridge this dualism in our thinking 
and the dual nature of objects “out there” in the world. In one light, Kant’s task 
may be to show there exists a concrete, sensible hint that freedom and the 
“thing-in-itself” might be real. If he can do that, he would also be able to unify na-
ture and freedom as well as the two great branches of philosophy—theory (or 
knowledge) and practice (ethics) together. Kant thinks he has that possible 
bridge in our experience of beauty. 
Now, the way Kant spoke about judgment before The Critique of Judg-
ment (1790) wasn’t as a fundamental faculty. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant used the word “judgment” to mean the cognitive action that subsumes par-
ticulars under general concepts. But without a principle of its own, judgment 
would remain a “worker bee” for understanding and reason. By the time he got to 
his third critique, judgment doesn’t merely work for understanding and reason 
anymore. Judgment became independent. How? Fortunately Kant discovered an 
a priori principle for judgment to be independent: purposiveness. Purposiveness 
is like the legislation that rules nature and is like the legislation that rules free-
dom.
Before we see how Kant unified philosophy using judgment’s a priori prin-
ciple of purposiveness, we need to define understanding and reason first. Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment won’t make sense otherwise. 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CHAPTER 3. 
KANT’S THREE FACULTIES
CHAPTER 3: KANT’S THREE FACULTIES 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment may have been a surprise even to Kant—it 
doesn’t appear to have been part of his original plan.  Instead, the third critique 113
may have emerged after completing his first two critiques. He faced a problem: 
how to unify his critical philosophy into a single discipline? Consequently, it’s dif-
ficult to understand The Critique of Judgment without having a background of 
Kant’s philosophy first. That’s the task of this chapter, to establish that back-
ground.
Again, Kant relies on an understanding of certain terms. I’ll sketch out 
three crucial terms: understanding, reason, and judgment. According to Kant, 
these are the three faculties or “powers” of the mind. At the end of this chapter, I’ll 
sketch out how Kant organized The Critique of Judgment.
I should also say something about the translation I’ll be using here at the 
outset. Several translations are available of the Critique of Judgment. The one 
we’ll use in chapters 3-5 (where we delve into that critique) is the James Creed 
Meredith translation. And I’ll indicate passages in that text by section number 
rather than page number to facilitate the use of the variety of those translations.
Here’s an overview of the difference between Kant’s three fundamental 
faculties:
 Douglas Burnham, “Kant’s Aesthetics,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://113
www.iep.utm.edu/kantaest (last modified June 30, 2005).
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Table 3.1.   Kant’s Three Faculties 
Let’s fill in the details.114
A. Understanding
Understanding is what allows us to know nature. It’s split into two capaci-
ties but bound together by imagination. The first capacity is receptive, the second 
conceptual. Kant calls the receptive capacity “sensibility,” and the conceptual ca-
pacity “understanding.” 
1. Sensibility (receptive capacity)
As the receptive capacity, sensibility receives data from the external world, 
and does so in terms of time and space. Kant’s term for external data is 
“intuition.” 
Faculties Tools A priori principles Application
Understanding Cognition Conformity to law (or  
Kant’s 12 categories) 
Nature
Judgment Feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure
Purposiveness Art
Reason Desire (or will) Final Purpose (or The 
Ultimate Good)
Freedom
 I put “art” under reflective judgment’s application because that’s the approach it takes. 114
In other words, reflective judgment looks at nature (and obviously art) as an artwork. Also, judg-
ment in its reflective function (not its logical function) becomes independent from reason and un-
derstanding thanks to the feeling of “disinterested pleasure” and the a priori principle of “purpo-
siveness.” More on what those terms mean in the next chapter. 
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A translator of Kant named Paul Carus made the point in his essay “Kant’s 
Philosophy” that Kant doesn’t mean “intuition” in the mystical way the word can 
sometimes mean. Kant’s word is actually Anschauung, and like the Latin intuitio, 
the term signifies the act of looking at an object.  But Kant extends that mean115 -
ing to sense-perception and argues it contains the a priori forms of time and 
space. So, for example, sensibility receives a “representation” of a tree without a 
label or concept. An intuition, still without a label or concept, sees the tree within 
time and space.
As the conceptual capacity, understanding subsumes particular intuitions 
under universal concepts. This action of subsumption is actually the work of 
judgment, but the universal concepts belong to understanding. Concepts are 
what allow us to “understand” data (or intuitions). In other words, without con-
cepts we don’t understand the intuitions that hit our senses. 
At the same time, without intuitions we can’t know either. Said another 
way, without intuitions our concepts would be empty, abstract, devoid of content. 
So we need both universals and particulars in order to understand anything. 
Kant’s famous quote about this says there must be a balance between universals 
and particulars: “Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without con-
cepts are blind… only from their union can cognition arise.”
In a sense, then, Kant’s sensibility is like the basis of knowledge for em-
piricist philosophers who had argued knowledge can only come from experience, 
not from innate ideas. Likewise, understanding is like the source of knowledge for 
 Paul Carus, “Kant’s Philosophy” in Prolegomena by Immanuel Kant (Chicago: Open 115
Court Classics, 1997), 184.
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rationalist philosophers who had argued innate ideas lead to true knowledge. 
Kant says both are right: we need both experience and a priori concepts to un-
derstand.
Another way of thinking about understanding’s conceptual capacity is to 
see it as a pattern-seer. In other words, our concepts see patterns (or “univer-
sals”) in “particulars.” So if sensibility provides intuitions of Golden Retrievers, 
Poodles, German Shepherds, then understanding identifies the pattern (or ab-
stract universal) in the particulars as “dog.” 
2. Understanding (conceptual capacity)
Now, our concepts can be both a priori or a posteriori. Again, this seems to 
be a synthesis of empiricist philosophy and rationalist philosophy. Empiricists 
claimed we get our concepts only after or “posterior” to experience, i.e., after 
having intuitions. The rationalists claimed true knowledge is embedded in our 
soul before or “prior” to experience.  Kant argues we have some concepts ready-
made within us a priori, but much of our knowledge comes from experience. We 
need both to understand.
An extreme (and outright defective) example of a concept learned a poste-
riori may be: “all men with blonde hair and blue eyes are superior to other hu-
mans.” A Nazi would apply this learned concept to an “intuition” of persons. So, if 
he comes across a brunette lady with dark-eyes, he’d judge her inferior to him 
and then treat her with inhumanity. One benefit of philosophy is that it looks criti-
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cally at a posteriori concepts (learned assumptions we take for granted as true) 
that go on to affect our feelings and behavior. 
The focus for Kant in Critique of Pure Reason is a priori concepts, though. 
The term a priori comes from rationalist philosopher Leibniz. In his “principle of 
identity,” he divided all propositions into two types: analytic propositions and syn-
thetic propositions. The table below defines the difference between them:
Table 3.2.   Leibniz’s Analytic vs. Synthetic Propositions 
So, for example, these would be examples of analytic propositions:
1. All bachelors are men.
2. 2 + 3 = 5
3. Either A or not-A
And these would be examples of synthetic propositions:
1. All bachelors are lonely.
2. There are two oranges on the table, and three apples in the fridge.
3. I’m going to complete my thesis.
We know the statement “all bachelors are men” is true necessarily a priori 
just by its definition. Why? Because the meaning of the word “bachelor” is to be 
“unmarried.” That statement is true without having to check with every bachelor 
to see if he’s unmarried. If he’s a bachelor, he’s unmarried. But saying “all bache-
lors are lonely,” I do have to go out into the world to see if that’s really true or not. 
ANALYTIC SYNTHETIC
1. True by definition 1. True by facts
2. Necessarily true 2. Conditionally true based on facts
3. A priori, known before experience 3. A posteriori, known after experience
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Leibniz made the surprising move in saying all synthetic propositions are 
analytic—when we see them from God’s point-of-view, outside of time. But to us, 
limited by time, those truths appear contingent. In other words, following Leibniz’s 
“principle of sufficient reason,” if anything exists the way it is, there’s a necessary 
reason why. His last principle, the “principle of internal harmony,” famously says if 
God is rational and good then God created the best possible of worlds.
Then Hume entered the scene, the most devastating empiricist philoso-
pher. He revived Leibniz’s analytic-synthetic distinction, but used it against ratio-
nalist philosophy. Hume called analytic statements “relation of ideas” and syn-
thetic statements “matters of fact.” Now, it may seem surprising that an empiricist 
like Hume admitted there were such things as a priori truths—it sounds at first 
like Hume admits not all knowledge comes from experience. But Hume makes a 
ruinous observation about analytic statements. They’re tautological. Redundant. 
Trivial. They give no new knowledge.
But it gets worse. 
According to Hume there truly are only two categories of knowledge: rela-
tions of ideas (analytic a priori statements that are tautological and give no new 
knowledge), matters of fact (synthetic a posteriori statements from experience 
that do give new knowledge). And there’s nonsense. Hume shows “truths” we 
normally take for granted—cause-and-effect, time-and-space, the self, gravity, 
inductive reasoning, God—are actually nonsense. For example, we can point to 
a clock, but we can’t point to time itself, or cause itself or gravity itself.
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When Kant read Hume’s powerful argument in An Inquiry Concerning the 
Human Understanding, he famously said it “awakened him from his dogmatic 
slumber.” Kant realized no progress in philosophy or science could be made un-
less Hume’s arguments were refuted. Kant refutes Hume by inventing a new cat-
egory of knowledge.
Kant accepted that analytic a priori statements are tautological and give 
no new knowledge. And he accepted that much of our knowledge is synthetic a 
posteriori. But Kant asked whether there could be such a thing as synthetic a pri-
ori propositions? Here’s another graph to illustrate what Kant tried to do:
Table 3.3.   Kant’s Analytic vs. Synthetic Propositions 
That is, could there be such a category of knowledge that gives us new 
knowledge but which isn’t dependent on experience? Could there be synthetic a 
priori knowledge? Analytic a posteriori propositions make no sense because ana-
lytic propositions give no new knowledge as it simply breaks down an (abstract) 
ANALYTIC 
(gives no knowledge)
SYNTHETIC
(gives knowledge)
a priori
(before experience)
ANALYTIC 
a priori
(gives no knowledge;
true before experience)
HUME’S “RELATION OF 
IDEAS”
SYNTHETIC 
a priori
(gives knowledge; 
true before experience)
KANT’S NEW CATEGORY
a posteriori
(after experience)
ANALYTIC 
a posteriori
(contradiction)
SYNTHETIC
a posteriori
(gives knowledge; 
true from experience)
HUME’S “MATTERS OF 
FACT”
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definition. But a posteriori gives new knowledge because it means it’s based in 
(concrete) experience. Those two together are contradictory. But can there be 
synthetic a priori knowledge? Synthetic a priori not in Descartes’s way where a 
baby is born with the idea of God. Kant rejects that as not grounded in evidence. 
But synthetic a priori in some other way? 
For example, Kant shows the proposition “7 + 5 = 12” is not an analytical 
statement. Analyzing the concept “12” doesn’t automatically yield “7 + 5.” “12” 
could also be broken down as “6 + 6,” “8 + 4” and so on. That’s actually a syn-
thetic statement, but it’s also true a priori. Likewise, the statement “a straight line 
is the shortest path between two points” is a synthetic statement. Analyzing a 
“straight line” doesn’t yield that statement. But visualization and experience can 
aid us in discovering it. So, it’s a synthetic statement that gives us new knowl-
edge and it’s also true a priori, independent of experience. 
Kant goes on to show that time-and-space and cause-and-effect fall under 
the synthetic a priori category, too. In other words, time-and-space and cause-
and-effect aren’t features of external experience but features of the structure of 
the mind. In what Kant calls a “Copernican revolution,” Kant argues cognition of 
the world isn’t passive. It’s active. That is, the mind isn’t like a soft piece of wax 
that gets impressed by the external world. The mind actively organizes a posteri-
ori experience, experience that’s objective. So, just as Copernicus replaced the 
earth with the sun as the center, “synthetic a priori” concepts replaces a passive 
mind for an active mind, i.e., for example, causality isn’t “out there” but a catego-
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ry of the mind. Kant’s notion that our minds are active changed philosophy forev-
er.
It’s an astonishing claim. Time-and-space, cause-and-effect exist not a 
posteriori “out there” but a priori in our minds. It’s these a priori “concepts” that 
help us to know anything at all. Without these a priori concepts, we would have 
no way of organizing data from nature. So, the reason Hume couldn’t point to 
time or causality is the same reason why an eye can’t “see” itself—they’re parts 
of our “eyes.” 
Now, time and space belong to sensibility, our receptive capacity. More 
specifically, time and space are a priori forms of intuition. Sensibility, on the other 
hand, is the capacity for receiving intuitions,  and doesn’t contain time and 116
space.  The concepts of quantity, quality, relation, and modality belong to un117 -
derstanding, our conceptual capacity. All these concepts together make it possi-
ble for us to understand anything. They’re “irremovable goggles” that filter our 
intuitions. That means anything that exists outside time and space (or outside 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality) can’t be known in the way we can know, 
say, a tree. This includes God, freedom, the soul. A tree-in-itself must exist be-
cause it causes the objective appearance of a tree. But because minds are limit-
ed by a priori concepts like causality (as well as the forms of intuition, like time 
and space), we can never see the tree-in-itself.
 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, (New York: 116
Prometheus Books, 1990, 21, Part First: Transcendental Aesthetic, Introductory.
 Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics That Can Qualify as a Sci117 -
ence, trans.Paul Carus, (Chicago: Open Court Classics, 1997), 65, section 24.
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So, Kant giveth and Kant taketh away. He protects science and common 
sense from Hume’s attacks. But he also takes away, too. By distinguishing be-
tween appearances and things-in-themselves where appearance can be known, 
but things-in-themselves can never be known (as they lie outside the bounds of 
experience), Kant took away metaphysics. At the end of Critique of Pure Reason 
in his “Dialectic of Pure Reason,” Kant has a trick up his sleeve, though. We’ll get 
to that when we look at reason.
So much for sensibility and understanding. The bridge that connects these 
two together is imagination.
3. Imagination (bridge)
This is surprising because, again, Kant defined judgment as subsuming 
particulars under concepts. Judgment would seem the perfect candidate to act as 
the bridge between sensibility and understanding. Problem is, judgment deals 
more with concepts than with sensibility. Judgment subsumes representations of 
the external world under concepts, but deals with more conceptual representa-
tions. Imagination, on the other hand, deals with the senses and concrete intu-
itions more directly, yet has a conceptual characteristic, too. 
Another way of saying this is, imagination can mediate and link sensibility 
and understanding because it has characteristics of both sensibility and under-
standing. Imagination is like sensibility because imagination gathers and unifies a 
posteriori intuitions together. Imagination is like understanding because it’s 
grounded in “apperception.”
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“Apperception” is our pure, original, unchangeable consciousness. It’s the 
awareness that I’m aware; the I think that accompanies every judgment.  It pre118 -
cedes all experience, and its unity is both the a priori ground of all understand-
ing’s concepts as well as the ground of imagination. Apperception (or conscious-
ness) is always there. It sees the manifold of intuitions. As apperception holds 
together experiences together as one, it allows imagination to synthesize intu-
itions and give them to our concepts. So, apperception is the original instigator of 
both imagination and our concepts.
One way of thinking about Kant’s version of the imagination is as a syn-
thesizer.  Imagination synthesizes intuitions together, then brings them to empty 119
concepts. Something like myth, imagination has no direct understanding of intu-
itions. Or, like a dream, imagination is a blind play of representations. Without 
concepts, imagination is blind. It’s a “precritical” stage of knowledge. 
4. Sensibility, imagination, and understanding together
But here’s what understanding, sensibility, and imagination look like to-
gether: We receive intuitions through the receptive capacity of sensibility in terms 
of time and space. Imagination then unifies these intuitions together and gives 
the sum of them (the intuitions) to the understanding. Understanding as judgment 
subsumes these particulars under universals. We then come to know and under-
stand. 
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 77, Section II of Chapter II in Book I of the First Divi118 -
sion.
 Ibid., 60, Section III of Chapter I in Book I of the First Division.119
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Now, what happens when our mind begins to subsume all the concepts of 
the understanding as a unified whole? We step outside the realm of understand-
ing, and into the realm of reason, i.e., we leave the realm of science and we en-
ter the realm of metaphysics and ethics.
B. Reason
Reason “transcends” knowledge. If understanding subsumes particulars 
under universals (via judgment), then reason subsumes those universals under 
even more unifying universals (also via judgment). Reason moves us beyond the 
particular and the contingent to touch what’s absolute, universal, unconditioned. 
Reason is at once like a bird seeking the forest from the trees, and like an in-
quisitor seeking to peek behind the veil of appearances. So, Kant isn’t using word 
“reason” in the usual sense of “logic” or “rationality.” His reason is more like Pla-
to’s Nous (usually translated from Greek as “reason”) that lifts us up towards the 
realm of Ideas. Reason has two employments: metaphysical (or “pure reason”) 
and ethical (or “pure practical reason”).
1. Pure reason (metaphysics)
In terms of metaphysics (i.e., “pure reason”), reason reaches for higher 
and higher generalities to explain why things are the way they are. It wants to 
see all nature as a unified whole, to unify all knowledge, to move beyond the par-
ticular, conditioned realm towards the universal and unconditioned. In a way, it 
wants to know everything. It’s also that part of us that observes the “me.” That is, 
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whenever we become aware of our thoughts and ask, “who is it that’s thinking?” 
this may be reason at work. 
Here’s an example of how reason works: through understanding I see the 
cause of me was my parents. I see the cause of my parents were their parents. 
Reason takes over and keeps tracing these causes back further and further until 
it asks, “well what’s the First Cause of everything?” So, it moves beyond experi-
ence in nature towards stepping outside nature to see it all as an organized 
whole. That’s exactly why reason posits ”ideas” such as God, immortality, free-
dom. Understanding has “concepts,” reason has “ideas.” Kant uses the term 
“ideas” because these can’t have intuitions as reason aims beyond appearances. 
In any event, reason seeks rest from the regression of conditions, to something 
unconditioned, completing the series.
But the tragedy is, reason can never know everything—though it yearns 
for knowledge of the totality of things. Why can’t we know everything? Because 
we can’t have the sensation of totality. As we saw with understanding, one of the 
conditions to understand something is having intuitions, then applying a priori 
concepts to them. The sensation of totality transcends our concepts of time and 
space, so we can’t understand it. Another way of saying this is, God, freedom, 
immortality are concepts but without intuitions, without content. So, they’re empty.
Another reason we can’t know everything: when reason tries to know what 
can’t be known, it generates a contradiction. And another contradiction. And an-
other contradiction—which all mean nothing. In other words, rather than peter 
out, reason keeps doing intellectual gymnastics to come up with more absurd 
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hypotheses.  These propositions that lack content lead to their logical opposite, 120
until it crashes and burns, accomplishing nothing. This has been true in the histo-
ry of philosophy. Tempted by reason to know what can’t be known, philosophers 
construct vast metaphysical castles that turn out to be clouds. Kant called these 
intellectual vacuities (which generate contradictions) “dialectics”—a throwback to 
the way ancient Greek philosophers argued back and forth. 
More importantly, Kant thought it’s a great thing reason can’t know every-
thing or God. Knowing God as if an object reduces God to a corpse that gets dis-
sected in biology class. To presume omniscience is to presume superiority over 
God. This threatens the foundation of morals. The moral law is antithetical to 
“separating out” the self as if an overlord. Even “God” must abide by the moral 
law—or as Kant seems to hint at the end of Critique of Judgment, perhaps God 
and the moral law are the same.
So the “tragedy” is, each of us is driven to know things-in-themselves, but 
we’re barred from this realm. We’re like the donkey who has a stick tied to his 
back with a delicious carrot dangling at its end in front of our eyes. We forever 
chase after the carrot thinking it’s just within reach, but never is. It’s sad.
The lovely part of this insight is this, though. Yes, we human beings can’t 
help positing metaphysical ideas, as if we’re hardwired to believe in things that 
 One example Kant gives is in the first of his four antinomies found in his first critique. 120
If we say time and space has a beginning we still want to know what happened before time and 
space (as if what happened before time and space happened in time and space). On the other 
hand, if we think of time and space as infinite (with no beginning) this still doesn’t work. We see 
space and time as an infinite series of events in finite time and finite space. The point is, when we 
apply our experience of time and space to what’s not in time and space we generate contradic-
tions.
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have no basis in reality. But there’s good news. I’ll break the good news down 
into three parts.
First, the drive of reason pushes us to know more and more and more. 
That’s great for inquiry and science. Kant says we just must take care to recog-
nize we can never get to the end. We also must avoid believing the ideas we 
posit are fact. That way  we can avoid falling into a ditch. That is, we can dream 
up strategies to get to the end, but we must remember that an air-breathing jet 
can’t leave the atmosphere.121
Second, it’s important to assume “transcendental” concepts like “the will is 
free,” “the soul is immortal,” and “God is real.” Again, as long as we’re aware 
they’re assumptions, not fact. Kant says these are actually matters of faith. But 
why are these assumptions so important? They give reason rest. They also pro-
vide us with a sense of purpose to life. These assumptions give life meaning. In 
that way they’re “practical postulates.” Otherwise, why get out of bed in the morn-
ing? If freedom is not possible, the moral law (and progress) is an illusion.
This second point is such an important point, it merits us pausing for a 
second to dwell on it. 
The scientific backdrop that Kant was writing against was Newtonian 
physics (before relativity and quantum mechanics challenged it). The accepted 
idea in the 18th century following Newtonian science was nature obeyed natural 
laws. (By the way, Newton’s “natural laws” still work in everyday experience—it’s 
 I got that wonderful illustration from Lawrence Cahoone, “Kant’s Copernican Revolu121 -
tion” in The Modern Intellectual Tradition: From Descartes to Derrida, (Chantilly: The Great Cour-
ses, 2010).
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just at distances of light-years or when we peer deep into subatomic levels that 
Newton’s “common sense” science no longer works.) But one danger of New-
ton’s mechanistic science was the possibility of reducing morality and free will to 
matter. In fact, scientists even in our century have tried reducing the human mind 
to neurochemistry. But Kant’s distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself 
prevents this. 
That is, yes reason can never know things-in-themselves, but neither can 
understanding reduce things-in-themselves to appearance. In other words, sci-
ence can never make scientific claims about free will or the purpose of life. Nei-
ther can it disprove God, the immortal soul, or freedom. The reason is, science 
would now be entering the realm of things-in-themselves, beyond the categories 
of understanding. 
So, at first Kant seemed to have shut-up reason and metaphysics. But he 
also limits understanding (and science), too. That means we’re free to believe in 
free will or God, especially when it gives our lives meaning. But Kant thinks we 
also need to assume freedom is possible, even though we can’t explain how it’s 
possible. And science can’t take these assumptions away. Said another way, sci-
ence can never definitively disprove the supersensible because it lies outside na-
ture, outside the realm of science. This leads into the third reason these assump-
tions are important.
Third, rational assumptions like freedom make ethics possible. If every-
thing were determined, moral choice and moral responsibility would vanish. If 
there were no freedom, I would become a victim of fate and I could blame my 
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“choices” on circumstance. The preservation of freedom and ethics isn’t just great 
news, it’s fantastic news. It’s through ethics reason can finally touch the super-
sensible realm. And that’s exactly why reason in its practical capacity (ethics) is 
more important than reason in its pure capacity (metaphysics).
2. Practical reason (ethics)
Reason’s second employment as practical reason (i.e., ethics) is more im-
portant because we can actually reach the supersensible. Again, we don’t reach 
it through metaphysical knowledge but through ethical practice. Through ethics 
we become free in the same way the supersensible realm is free. But practice of 
what? Applying the moral law.
The moral law isn’t scientific law. In fact, most of the time in the realm of 
“decision-making” we follow what Kant calls “hypothetical imperatives,” which 
science can discover. “Hypothetical imperatives” derive from conditions, from “if, 
then.” For example, if I feel hungry, I’ll get something to eat. If I want money, I’ll 
play the stock market. If I don’t want to get yelled at, I’ll lie. Understanding and 
science can easily discover hypothetical imperatives through experience. Only 
problem is, hypothetical imperatives are driven by self-interest, inclination, de-
sires. How moral is making decisions based on “hypothetical” consequences? 
Enter reason. Reason can find the single, universal, a priori moral law 
that’s true before experience, that’s true after experience forever and ever. It 
sums up all morality and must be applied anywhere, anytime. That is, this moral 
law is independent of self-interest, inclination, desire, “if, then” conditions. That’s 
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why Kant’s famous term for the moral law was the “categorical imperative.” It 
must be followed no matter what, irregardless of consequences. But by practicing 
the application of the moral law even in our most mundane choices—even if our 
inclinations don’t want to—we lessen our slavery to self-interest and become 
freer.
In the second formulation of the categorical imperative Kant says, “act so 
as to treat rational beings as ends in themselves, never solely as means.” Per-
sonally, to my ears, this sounds like empathy, if empathy is “to put one’s ‘thing-in-
itself self’ in someone else’s ‘thing-in-itself place’—to see through their eyes and 
to see we’re things-in-themselves in common.” So, if I feel hatred for a Russian 
solider who was part of Communist Russia, empathy would stop me. Empathy or 
the categorical imperative would have me pause to think, “If I were in his shoes in 
his country, I would probably be doing the same thing. Understanding may cate-
gorize him as ‘enemy.’ But if I use reason to look into his eyes, wouldn’t I see 
myself? Wouldn’t I hate myself?” 
Where compassion may be “feeling with” another’s feelings (and it’s not 
necessary to put myself in their place), empathy takes thought. Etymologically 
empathy in Greek and compassion in Latin essentially mean the same thing: 
“feeling with.” Still, we seem to use the terms in different ways. When we use 
thought to put ourselves in another’s skin, we seem to use the word empathy. 
When we feel the same emotions with another, we seem to use the word com-
passion. In any event, the categorical imperative takes reason to put myself in 
another’s place and to remember another person as a thing-in-itself like me. 
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Kant’s second formulation to treat others as a thing-in-itself rather than as an ap-
pearance to be used for my self-interest to me is empathy.
In the third formulation, Kant adds “Treat every person, including yourself, 
with respect owed to someone who is a universal moral legislator” (italics my 
own). So, another temptation is to treat others as things-in-themselves but to 
treat myself harshly as an appearance. Kant seems to add a dimension to 
Christ’s golden rule by adding we must treat ourselves with respect, too. 
And of course Kant’s most famous formulation is probably the first, “Act so 
that you can will the maxim of your act to be universal law.” That means if my in-
clination screams at me to steal money from an open cash drawer, again I have 
to pause and imagine what that action would look like if everyone did that. I 
would discover a “higher road” than my self-interested inclination. If I in turn 
choose the “high road” over my impulse (even though my impulse would resist), I 
become freer from the “natural law” of impulse. And I’m choosing this road not to 
be recognized as “morally superior,” i.e., to get a gold star. Everything in me 
wants to take the money. I get nothing out of this action. No recognition, no 
praise, no cash. I go against my want. Then I follow the moral law not for conse-
quence or self-interest but because it’s right. I lessen my self-interest in the 
process.
That’s why Kant argues reason and will are the same. Having a strong will 
means to act rationally, not impulsively. “Will,” then, is rational control of impulse. 
Will is also the same thing as freedom. For example, if all things in nature obey 
natural law, only will is free from that law. So, for instance, a falling body, whether 
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feather, rock, human, will obey Galileo’s laws of motion (all bodies accelerate at 
the same rate regardless of mass). But “will” can decide whether it’s safe to jump 
at a certain height and not jump. When a person acts according to reason rather 
than the momentary impulse of our “biological urges,” he’s using “will.” He has 
self-control and is free from natural laws of impulse. More importantly, he’s free 
because he’s moving toward aligning himself with the supersensible realm, 
where “The Good” or the moral law resides. It’s both negative and positive free-
dom. The point is, reason, will, and freedom are all interconnected, then.
One last point about Kant’s touching the supersensible realm through eth-
ical action, not metaphysical knowledge. As Kant said in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, we can only see the appearances of things, never beyond them. In a 
similar way, we appear as an appearance to another and they can never see us 
as thing-in-itself. But we don’t experience ourselves as an appearance but as a 
thing-in-itself. True, even here when we look into our noumenal selves, we still 
only “appear” to ourselves and don’t know who we “really” are, independent of 
experience.  Yet when we follow the categorical imperative (rather than just 122
posit metaphysical ideas about it) and treat another as a thing-in-itself in the way 
we may feel like a thing-in-itself, we may not be aware of it, but in those ethical 
actions we get closer to the freedom of the supersensible realm.
Here’s the interesting connection between reason, understanding, and 
judgment. 
 Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 122
246.
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Reason uses judgment just as understanding uses judgment. Judgment 
subsumes particulars under (universal) concepts. Understanding subsumes intu-
itions under concepts via judgment. Reason subsumes particular decision-mak-
ing cases under ideas via judgment. But so far judgment just combines represen-
tations, whether of reason or understanding. 
Things change for judgment when we experience the thing-in-itself not as 
distinct from appearance but entwined with appearance. That’s the nature of 
beauty. 
C. Judgment
To repeat, by the end of the second critique, judgment was just an action 
reason and understanding used to subsume particulars under concepts. Judg-
ment had no a priori  concept of its own then. In fact, to judge is to think. When-
ever we apply a universal to a particular, we judge. 
But before we conceptualize, we experience. Without a posteriori con-
cepts, we’re able to see an appearance yet sense there’s something more to it 
than meets the eye—though our minds are structured a priori in such a way that 
we can’t see the thing-in-itself. Aesthetic and teleological judgments suspend our 
a posteriori concepts. 
As we saw, judgment does this through its own “irremovable goggles” or a 
priori principle of “purposiveness.” This allows judgment to experience the super-
sensible and the sensible as a unity. In that way it bridges understanding and 
reason together. 
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As we hinted at, judgment’s a priori concept neither gives knowledge nor 
lets us know how to act ethically. It simply reflects, i.e., looks and listens. Again, 
its a priori concept is “purposiveness.” Its tool is the “feeling of pleasure and dis-
pleasure.” That is, when we come upon purposiveness without purpose in nature 
and fine art, our imagination, understanding, and sometimes reason are thrown 
into a harmonious free play. This gives us a pleasure that’s not self-interested 
(similar to morality). For Kant, this is the experience of beauty. 
Finally, we’re in a position to see exactly how judgment bridges the gulf 
between science and ethics. But first, a brief glance at how Kant organized the 
Critique of Judgment.
1. How Kant Organized The Critique of Judgment
Kant organized the Critique of Judgment along two kinds of reflective 
judgments: aesthetic and teleological. Before I go further, I should say a quick 
word about what Kant meant by the term “reflective judgment.” 
“Reflective judgments” are different from “logical judgments.” Kant covered 
logical judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason. Those judgments are in the 
service of understanding in order to know. But in reflective judgments, judgment 
is no longer in service to any other faculty but itself. When judgment reflects on 
nature, it doesn’t labor to know or labor to decide. It’s relaxed, at rest, on its own. 
All it’s concerned with is taking pleasure in the purposiveness in nature. At times 
rational ideas may come in to help appreciate the way nature continually creates 
itself (teleological judgment). At other times understanding may come in to ap-
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preciate the beauty of that zebra or that tree (“dependent beauty” in aesthetic 
judgment). But in either case, reason and understanding are now in the service 
to judgment. Judgment becomes the leader when it only seeks for purposive-
ness, again neither needing to do nor needing to know. In this “restful contempla-
tion” as Kant puts it, judgment just reflects. This elevates us.
Now, “aesthetic judgment” centers on the experiences of the beautiful and 
the sublime, and those reflections help us produce art. “Teleological judgment” 
centers on living beings. It’s the judgment where we’re aware organisms are alive 
as ends-in-themselves. Based on that judgment, Kant infers there might be pur-
pose in nature as a whole. Reflective judgment, then, includes aesthetic and 
teleological judgment. It involves reflecting on nature, feeling the selfless stance 
of morality, and opening ourselves to “ideas” and feelings that could lead us to 
create fine art. Judgment bridges nature and freedom. 
So Part One of the Critique of Judgment focuses on Aesthetic Judgment. 
Part Two focuses on Teleological Judgment. 
In Part One, Kant deals with beauty first, the sublime second, and fine art 
third. The beautiful corresponds with understanding and imagination. The sub-
lime corresponds with reason and imagination. In fine art, imagination plays a 
key role alongside both reason and understanding.
In Part Two, Kant deals with living organisms that seem to embody their 
own purpose. That is, Kant asks how do we recognize organisms not just as 
phenomena but also as purposeful with an “intrinsic purpose.” In other words, 
teleological judgment sees natural organisms as beings not for us to use, but as 
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purposeful from their own viewpoint. Telos comes from the Greek for purpose or 
end, and we’ll see how Kant takes Aristotle as his inspiration. Like aesthetic 
judgments, teleological judgment reflects. It doesn’t give us scientific knowledge 
or tell us how to act, but it might hint that the universe has purpose. 
 Both Part One and Part Two are further divided in two identical ways: an 
analytic section and a dialectic section. For Kant, this follows the scheme of phi-
losophy in general: we start by analyzing a subject-matter into its components. 
We end by resolving any apparent contradictions (a dialectic) back into a whole, 
or synthesis.
Another similarity between Part One and Part Two is both parts begin with 
how judgment works with understanding and nature, then moves to how judg-
ment works with reason and freedom. At the end of Part Two, Kant even gives a 
unique argument of God  by beginning with nature. That means both aesthetic 123
and teleological judgments work with understanding and reason in reason’s ethi-
cal and metaphysical employments. 
Here’s a visual layout of the The Critique of Judgment:
 Unique because Kant doesn’t try to give knowledge of God’s existence.123
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Table 3.4.   Layout of Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
I. FIRST PART. Critique of AESTHETIC Judgment
A. 1st Division. ANALYTIC of “Aesthetic” Judgment
1. Book 1. Analytic of THE BEAUTIFUL
2. Book 2. Analytic of THE SUBLIME (includes a discussion on fine 
art)
B. 2nd Division. DIALECTIC of “Aesthetic” Judgment
II. SECOND PART. Critique of TELEOLOGICAL Judgment
A. 1st Division. ANALYTIC of “Teleological” Judgment
B. 2nd Division. DIALECTIC of “Teleological” Judgment
C. Appendix. APPLYING “Teleological” Judgment
With all these preliminaries out of the way, we can finally dig into Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment. Again, the driving question is whether it’s possible to over-
come the dichotomy between appearance (or determinism) and thing-in-itself (or 
freedom) both in terms of objects “out there,” as well as in terms of thinking “with-
in” our minds, i.e., bridging concrete understanding with abstract reason. Free-
dom and noumena are still abstract. But perhaps beauty can hint at their possible 
reality and their unity with appearance.   
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CHAPTER 4. 
KANT’S FOUR MOMENTS OF BEAUTY
CHAPTER 4: KANT’S FOUR MOMENTS OF BEAUTY 
In this chapter, let’s dig into Kan’t analysis of the beautiful.
A. Why Four “Moments”?
Kant organizes the analytic of the beautiful into four “moments.” These 
four moments correspond to the four a priori categories of the understanding: 
quality, quantity, modality, and relation. 
Category here has a similar meaning to the original Greek word. In Greek, 
category meant the predicate of a thing. That is, what can be said about some-
thing. For example, “the rose is red.” Category, then, is a thing’s attribute, quality, 
characteristic. 
Kant took the notion of category from Aristotle, who thought there were 10. 
Aristotle’s primary category was “substance.” Substance is unique because, of 
the 10, it’s independent and can exist on its own, i.e., a particular tree or a partic-
ular man isn’t a predicate of something else. But the kind of thing a particular 
thing is can be predicated of it. For example, Aristotle (subject) “is a man” (predi-
cate). Aristotle called these kinds “secondary substances.” Aristotle called the 
other 9 categories “accidentals” (or predicates). These were all the kinds of pred-
icates, in addition to substance, that could be asserted about a particular sub-
stance. For Aristotle these included: quality, quantity, relation, action, affection, 
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place, time, position, state. These 9 can’t exist independently of a substance, 
they describe a substance, i.e., greenness, tallness, yesterday, down, triple. 
They’re also possibilities, not absolutes. An object can’t have all predicates at the 
same time. For example, it’s impossible for a thing to be both present and ab-
sent. Or for a thing to be possible and impossible at the same time. Again, the 
categories are properties that belong to things. We can’t think about something 
without these categories.
Kant appreciated Aristotle’s effort but thought his list was imperfect. He 
thought Aristotle almost put them down as they came to him.  Kant, on the oth124 -
er hand, organized all categories into 4 groups. Under each group were three 
sub-categories. Here’s how Kant organized the categories:
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 62-3, Section III of Chapter I in Book I of the First Divi124 -
sion.
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Table 4.1.   Kant’s Twelve Categories 
Kant’s proposed list is less haphazard than Aristotle’s, but it’s not without 
issues. For example, Aristotle is still the innovator here—Kant seems to simply 
organize Aristotle’s list into a system. That system might be less empirical than 
Aristotle’s. What I mean is, even though Kant’s list is more systematically con-
ceived, he seems to also force things into a closed, static scheme that leaves out 
other possibilities, for example negative modalities.  Still, the idea behind this 125
scheme is brilliant: a priori categories such as causation is what allow us to un-
derstand anything at all.
By the way, as a side note, Kant also drew up the following table of logical 
judgments. As Kant says in his Prolegomena, “Thinking is the same as judging.” 
Objects of 
Intuition (Pure)
Objects of 
Intuition 
(Empirical)
Existence of 
Objects in 
relation to each 
other
Existence of 
Objects in 
relation to 
understanding
1. Quantity 
(subsumes 
phenomena 
using 
mathematics)
2. Quality 
(subsumes 
phenomena as 
real or not)
3. Relation 
(subsumes 
phenomena in 
relation with 
each other)
4. Modality 
(subsumes 
phenomena 
using the 
method of 
modifiers)
Condition Unity (one) Reality 
(presence)
Substance 
(subject and 
predicate)
Possibility 
(conditional)
Conditioned Plurality (many) Negation 
(absence)
Cause (cause 
and effect)
Existence 
(actual)
Combination Totality (all) Limitation 
(present till, then 
absent)
Community 
(reciprocal 
collection of all 
subjects)
Necessity 
(occurs under all 
conditions)
 Avi Sion, “Chapter 5. Kant’s “Categories,” TheLogician.Net, http://www.thelogi125 -
cian.net/6_reflect/6_Book_2/6b_chapter_05.htm, accessed July 12, 2016.
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What he means is when we try to understand something, we unite “representa-
tions” (sensible intuitions) with the a priori categories above. So, the four classes 
of judgments is logical activity. They correspond with the four classes of cate-
gories:
Table 4.2.   Kant’s Twelve Logical Judgments 
In any event, there were 12 a priori categories for Kant (not 10) we put our 
intuitions into that allows us to “know” them at all.
Now, why must things exist in trinities so much for Kant? In a footnote, 
Kant answers that question at the end of his Introduction to The Critique of 
Judgment. He says it’s due to the nature of the case. Analysis needs the law of 
contradiction. That means breaking a condition down into two: A and not-A. But if 
we’re to have a synthesis we also need a third element to bring the opposing pair 
back into a whole, a unity. So, we begin with a) a condition, b) see its opposite as 
the conditioned, and c) bring the conditioned into unity with its condition. Johan 
Gottlieb Fichte (1762 - 1814), a big fan of Kant, invented a more famous group of 
terms for what Kant was trying to say: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. 
Quality  (affirm/
deny)
Quantity (how much) Relation (relativity) Modality (possibility)
Affirmative Universal Categorical (absolute) Problematic (possible 
or impossible)
Negative Particular Hypothetical (maybe) Assertoric (asserts)
Infinite Singular Disjunctive (either/or) Apodeictic (self-
evident)
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Interestingly, the entire aim of the Critique of Judgment is exactly this: to 
synthesize his first two critiques back into a whole. 
Regardless, as Aristotle pointed out, we can’t think of a thing without these 
and Kant followed him. So, it makes sense that Kant organized his analytic of the 
beautiful in terms of the four a priori categories: quality, quantity, relation, and 
modality. Because we wouldn’t be able to experience or understand beauty with-
out these. 
Fascinatingly, the first three “moments” of beauty are each paradoxes. 
Then the fourth moment synthesizes the previous three paradoxes together. 
Here’s an overview:
Kant’s Four Moments: 
• Quality: We experience beauty with disinterested interest.
• Quantity: The beautiful is both universal yet subjective. 
• Relation: Beauty is purposive without purpose. 
• Modality: Beauty is a common sense all humans have: the 
beautiful senses the sensible and supersensible as one.
Kant thought if he could show how beauty is universal and “in the eye of 
the beholder” using an a priori principle, he could explain how we experience ap-
pearance as possibly more than its appearance. Let’s now look at each moment 
with a bit more detail.
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1. First Moment of Quality: Disinterested Interest
Kant begins with “quality” because our experience of beauty starts with 
disinterested interest. 
Interest means “I want” an object. It involves desire. Disinterest means 
“not wanting” an object. The experience of the beautiful, then, entails pleasure 
(interest) yet not needing to “have” the object of beauty (disinterest).
Beauty also entails disinterest because it can refer to a real thing (like na-
ture) or a thing that doesn’t exist (like art). An “inclination” or “personal prefer-
ence,” is in the eye of the beholder. A personal preference for vanilla ice cream is 
a personal desire, it’s not valid for all humans. But disinterested interest allows 
beauty to be universal. 
We discern beauty through feeling either pleasure or displeasure, which is 
subjective. We don’t discern it by intellectualizing or conceptualizing. But in the 
case of beauty, it’s a pleasure that doesn’t need to possess. To clarify this special 
kind of pleasure, Kant compares disinterested interest with two other kinds of in-
terest: the agreeable and the good. 
The agreeable delights the senses. That is, stimuli delight the senses. 
The delight is immediate. We’re gratified, our hunger is satiated, an itch is 
scratched. Here it makes perfect sense to have personal preferences. We may 
enjoy the way vanilla ice cream delights the taste buds. Another may enjoy the 
way chocolate delights the taste buds. Again, the agreeable is about consuming 
a real object. Having it, possessing it. Kant says the animal in us experiences the 
agreeable.
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The good is a delight we experience in the mind, through concepts. Kant 
says the human in us experiences the good. A real object is involved here, too. 
Our desire here is less about consumption and more about achieving a goal. Our 
minds see a goal. We will to reach it. When we achieve it, we feel pleasure and 
delight. That goal is real. The delight is more mediate though. So, the good in-
spires action. Also, the good involves, for example, when we know the concepts 
of how a fine play should be crafted and we use those concepts to discern 
whether that play is good. When we use concepts to judge and feel delight, the 
delight comes from the good, not the beautiful.
The beautiful, though, doesn’t need any concepts to please us. Aimless 
lines, shapes, arrangements, rhythms can please without knowing what its goal 
is. So, the beautiful doesn’t need a real object. It doesn’t need at all. Instead of 
desire, only the feelings of pleasure or displeasure are at work. We don’t need to 
possess or consume an object as with the agreeable. And we don’t need to act to 
achieve a goal as in the good. The beautiful is both intellectual like the good and 
sensible like the agreeable, but there’s no inclination to have. In a way, the beau-
tiful is like seeing a thing-in-itself, although we can never see a thing-in-itself. 
What I mean is, because we don’t need to consume it or to know it or to concep-
tualize it or to act to achieve it or to use it, we simply delight in its presence. As 
Kant says, both the animal and the human in us delight in the beautiful. 
An example of the beautiful as compared to the agreeable and the good: If 
we’re starving and devour a pizza without tasting the food, that delight from grati-
fication would be agreeable. If we conceptualize the pizza and say we shouldn’t 
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eat it because we’re trying to lower our cholesterol and we eat grilled chicken 
salad instead, that delight comes from the good. Beauty would be if we’ve al-
ready eaten and we don’t need to gratify ourselves. We sampled a slice of pizza 
whether it’s the right thing to eat it or not, we just pay attention to the flavors. The 
pleasure we feel from the flavors would be disinterested interest, without needing 
to satiate hunger or without needing to conceptualize.
The first moment of beauty then is the observation that we find pleasure in 
beauty without needing to possess it. Taking in a sunset may be another example 
of disinterested interest. We neither need to possess it nor conceptualize it. We 
simply look, and still feel pleasure. 
2. Second Moment of Quantity: Universal yet Subjective   
Related to the first moment, the second moment of quantity says every 
person must agree with my judgment of beauty. Yet their judgments must come 
from within their own Subject too. This relates to quantity because every person 
(quantity) must agree on what’s beautiful, without being told “that’s beautiful.” In 
other words, each person must come to the “conclusion” on their own. If a person 
was told to “believe” this was beautiful, the aesthetic judgment would then be 
conceptual. So even though beauty is subjective and personal, it must also agree 
with every other person. Quantity is linked with quality because the way this “uni-
versal yet subjective” judgment is possible is through disinterested interest.
As a review, disinterested interest is not a private feeling like the agree-
able. The agreeable pleases me personally, but no one else has to agree with 
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me. For example, one person may like the Beatles, another may prefer heavy 
metal. To quarrel over the agreeable as universal is absurd. Everyone has a right 
to their own opinion and to their own personal preference—in the realm of the 
agreeable, that is. Not so in the realm of the beautiful.
For example, to say “honey is beautiful to me” is an incorrect use of the 
term “beautiful.” For something to truly be beautiful, it must not only be true of 
one person, but for all persons. Otherwise we wouldn’t need the word beauty. It 
would refer to nothing, if everyone simply had their own preferences. Many may 
claim “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” as if it’s a personal preference, but 
that’s not how we use the term. 
Also, when we say “that’s beautiful,” we speak as if beauty were a proper-
ty of a thing. It’s not. For Kant, here’s where “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” 
has a sound point. Beauty must be subjective like the agreeable. Again, regurgi-
tating an authority figure’s concept of what’s beautiful means a person hasn’t had 
a subjective experience of beauty. Beauty must be a subjective feeling of plea-
sure, yet paradoxically it’s a subjective feeling shared with every person. That’s 
the point of the second moment.
Another distinction about quantity: every person shares this pleasure in a 
“universal” way, not in a “general” way. Universality and generality have a similar-
ity, but Kant says there’s an important difference. 
Here’s an example. In the 1960s, the marketing department at Cosmo 
magazine put Twiggy on the cover of their magazines. Many bought the maga-
zine and agreed “she’s beautiful”—in a general way. In the 1600s, Rubens paint-
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ed his women with voluptuousness. Many agreed then “those women are beauti-
ful”—in a general way. 
In both those cases, “general rules of convention” were followed. Yes, a 
great quantity of people were pleased. But they were pleased because conven-
tions were followed. This is a function of interest, not disinterested interest. Twig-
gy and Rubens’s women were respectively agreeable for the times. So, this isn’t 
a universal beauty. General rules were followed, like empirical rules. What is uni-
versally valid then? Kant will solve that in the third moment with his idea of pur-
posiveness without purpose.
But in the meantime, being “befogged” by “rules of convention” may ex-
plain why a great artwork is often “ahead of his time” and many in that time don’t 
see it yet. For example, Mozart’s Don Giovanni was panned by critics in Vienna 
when it first came out. Why? Because it had challenged some conventions of Ital-
ian opera. But when listening to the music without attachment to those dated 
conventions of what “should” be beautiful, who would say Don Giovanni isn’t 
beautiful? In other words, listening to Mozart’s music with “disinterested 
interest” (without rigid preconceptions) allows every person to feel beauty more 
easily.
So, the universal doesn’t rest on social rules of custom. The beautiful must 
be beautiful for every person, regardless of the a posteriori conceptual rules (and 
perhaps bias) in vogue of a culture. This allows us to judge more accurately 
what’s universally beautiful. 
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This brings up another paradox about this second moment. Concepts, like 
plurality, are universal. But to distinguish the beautiful from the true and the good, 
beauty must be universal apart from concepts. Otherwise beauty would be a 
mere cognition.
So, how can the beautiful be both subjective and universal (or a priori) and 
also apart from a priori concepts? Here Kant introduces an ingenious solution. 
The universal pleasure wrought from beauty is based on a free play between the 
understanding and the imagination.
It’s not that we feel pleasure first, then say that’s beautiful afterwards. That 
would be no different than the agreeable. Rather, disinterested pleasure is a re-
sult of something more fundamental. On the one hand, our a priori concepts (like 
presence and absence) are universal. On the other hand, the intuitions the imag-
ination brings to the concepts are also universal. But to subsume intuitions under 
a concept creates cognition and knowledge. So, rather than subsume intuitions 
under concepts what happens in the experience of beauty is, a free play between 
the two. 
And that’s exactly the pleasure we feel with beauty. The pleasure is a free 
play between imagination and understanding. We’re not trying to “know” an ob-
ject, or act towards a goal or use it. We simply enjoy the play and harmony be-
tween these universal faculties of the mind. But the play doesn’t happen intellec-
tually, otherwise we’re in the realm of knowledge and concepts again. It happens 
through the senses. We feel a type of harmony between the senses and the intel-
lect.
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So, that’s how the beautiful is both universal and also felt by every person. 
A priori concepts and intuitions are universal. The free play between the two is 
pleasurable, not business as usual when the two labor to know. Because the two 
are universal, when they’re at play they give us a universal pleasure.
This may explain why so many agree that Michelangelo’s David is beauti-
ful without having to rely on a teacher to tell them so. Or why we don’t have to 
learn from a book that a sunset is beautiful, yet everyone comes to feel its beauty 
on their own. In the free play between understanding and imagination we feel 
pleasure but don’t need to know it, consume it, use it, act on it. We get close to 
seeing an appearance as more than appearance.  
The third moment discusses what’s happening in an object that has us 
feel the pleasure of play between understanding and imagination. It’s about how 
we relate to an object of beauty.
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3. Third Moment of Relation: Purposiveness without Purpose
If the second moment of quantity explains the pleasure of beauty psycho-
logically, the third moment explains what’s happening in the object that causes us 
to feel pleasure. Again, beauty isn’t a property of the object, so this moment is 
what’s going on in an object that makes us feel disinterested interest. Again, Kant 
wants to show how beauty is universal, yet is also a subjective experience. In the 
third moment, we sense there’s something beyond the appearance of a thing.
Put another way, what causes us to feel disinterested interest is we sense 
in the form of an object, its purpose but we don’t what know what its purpose is. 
So, here’s the third paradox of beauty: beauty is both purposive and without pur-
pose. Meaning, we relate to an object’s purpose, without knowing its explicit pur-
pose. 
For me, one of the most compelling examples Kant gives of purposive-
ness without purpose is a tulip. In a tulip, we perceive a purpose in its lines. But 
we don’t know what the purpose is. It’s as if we come close to seeing the tulip as 
it is, but not quite. “Purposiveness” tells us we sense the “thing-in-itself” lying be-
neath the garment of phenomenon. “Without purpose” tells us appearance still 
conceals it.
In fact, this is Kant’s point in the last section of his “Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment,” in his dialectic. 
 80
i. Antinomies of Aesthetic Judgment.  
In sections 55 - 58, Kant brings up a series of antinomies, or claims that 
seem to contradict each other. The same kind of dialectical problems also ap-
peared in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. Those 
problems involve a confusion between the supersensible realm and the sensible 
realm. And that’s the case in this dialectic as well.
Here’s the antimony:
1. Thesis: Beauty can’t be based on concepts. In other words, it’s impos-
sible to describe what’s most hidden. It’s impossible to describe the taste of food. 
It’s impossible to explain what love in the heart feels like. These are all hidden. In 
a similar way, beauty can’t be reduced to concepts, labels, words. Beauty, then, 
isn’t up for dispute.
2. Antithesis: Beauty must be based on something a priori like the con-
cepts of unity and plurality. Otherwise, beauty can’t belong to every person. 
Here’s another way of putting the antimony:
1. Thesis: Scientific laws can’t describe beauty.
2. Antithesis: We can understand beauty scientifically. For example, we 
can describe how crystals are made scientifically. And crystals are objects of 
beauty. Also, nature understood scientifically isn’t purposive. Nature is random.
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Kant says the confusion is an illusion. The reason is, the supersensible 
lies at the base of beauty. And we can never understand the supersensible realm 
scientifically. 
In other words, the a priori “concept” that accounts for purposiveness is 
the supersensible realm underlying all nature, and that includes us humans as 
objects of nature. The supersensible realm is not a matter of scientific knowl-
edge. An object of beauty appears purposive to our limited human perspective. 
So, when we experience beauty we feel it on a subjective level. We can’t put it 
into words because we’re responding to the supersensible realm underlying the 
sensible realm. The reason this subjective experience can also belong to every 
person is because the supersensible realm is universal and a priori.
The way Kant puts it: the unfolding of beauty, whether in art or in nature, is 
like the product of some inner genius. Kant defines genius later (but unfortunately 
we won’t have enough space to discuss it here). This piques the interest of rea-
son, as reason seems to have found evidence for its far-reaching claims about 
the supersensible realm. This is the profundity of beauty. Beauty is a kind of reve-
lation of the hidden substrate of the world. Kant will argue it’s the basis of the 
highest human projects, like science and morality. In other words, beauty is the 
mediating link between science and morality. But I’m getting ahead of myself 
once again.
Let me just pause here to say how much I personally love this idea, be-
cause it complements Kant’s metaphysics and ethics. 
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Kant’s metaphysics tells us we can only know an object’s appearance, 
never the thing-in-itself. Kant’s ethics tells us, though we can only see a fellow 
human being’s appearance, we must relate to them as ends-in-themselves via 
experiencing ourselves as ends-in-themselves. Kant’s aesthetics seems to ex-
tend this idea beyond humanity to all phenomena, to all nature. Purposiveness is 
the name Kant gives for what seems to be going on in an object of nature (the 
supersensible realm) that causes us to feel disinterested interest (or beauty).
But back to the specifics of the third moment, which entail sections 10 - 
17. Before Kant digs into his concept of purposiveness, he defines some terms 
first. 
ii. Kant Defines Terms at the Outset.
1. Purpose. First, he defines “purpose.” Purpose means striving towards 
an end. Similar to Plato and Aristotle’s “The Good,” the ground of all nature is di-
rected to The Good, i.e., an end desired not for-the-sake-of something else but 
for-itself. The Good is the final telos (goal) on which all other goods (or ends) de-
pend. In fact, James Creed Meredith translates “purpose" and “purposiveness” 
as “final” and “finality” respectively. In any event, if purpose is an end, then where 
there’s purpose there’s a will, or the faculty of desire. That is, purpose is a desire 
to get to that end. 
2. Purposiveness. Second, Kant defines “purposiveness.” Purposiveness 
means the appearance of purpose. In other words, we don’t know what an ob-
ject’s purpose is. We just sense it. As Kant puts it, purposiveness means looking 
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at a thing without reason or understanding. If we looked at an object with reason 
or understanding—as something to know or to use—our judgment of it would be-
come conceptual, categorical. Purposive instead means to look at an object as it 
is, not as an object to know or to use. When we use aesthetic judgment to reflect 
on an object’s beauty, we get close to seeing it as a “thing-in-itself.” 
Let me see if I can say that in an even clearer way. On the one hand pur-
posiveness is an approach to an object, a kind of eye-glasses through which to 
look at an object. In this approach we don’t use an object, don’t conceptualize an 
object, and don’t consume an object. Instead we “appreciate" an object. On the 
other hand, purposiveness can also refer to the form of an object. For example, a 
passage of music may rise to a climax then fall, or the lines of a tulip may mean-
der with some (inner) purpose. These appear to have a sense of purpose, but we 
don’t know what that purposes is.
So, we can either approach an object as purposive, or some objects have 
the form of purposiveness and awaken aesthetic judgment within us. As I indicat-
ed above, when we sense in an artwork or in a natural object will aiming at a 
purpose, but we don’t know its purpose, the object has a form of “purposive-
ness.” But in either case, whether we approach an object as purposive or the 
purposive form of an object puts us in a purposive state-of-mind and we feel a 
“non-needy” (or disinterested) pleasure. We’ll develop that idea in a moment.
3. Disinterested. Third, he defines “disinterested” more explicitly here 
than earlier. As a review, disinterested means we don’t want to use the object for 
our gratification, i.e., possess it or consume it or act on it for our own self-interest. 
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4. Interest (or Pleasure). Fourth, he defines “pleasure” (or interest). Plea-
sure means we want to persevere in that state. By the way, he also defined plea-
sure earlier in the Introduction of the whole critique this way: pleasure is when we 
attain an aim (Introduction VI). Interestingly, Plato described The Beautiful in The 
Symposium in a similar way: Desire is desiring to be in the presence of The 
Beautiful forever. 
5. Displeasure. Fifth, Kant defines “displeasure.” Displeasure means 
when a representation repulses us, makes us not want to be in that state forever. 
We want to end that state as quickly as possible. That does sound like pain. 
6. Disinterested Interest. Sixth, Kant defines “disinterested pleasure” 
more explicitly here too. Disinterested interest means we’re arrested in the pres-
ence of an object and we don’t want the state to end, yet we don’t need to con-
sume it either. Although these aren’t Kant’s words, perhaps disinterested plea-
sure is like falling in love but not needing to possess the person. Or, like being 
absorbed in a live performance of a concert pianist, where we don’t want it to end 
and feel as if time stood still but don’t need to possess anything. There’s no cog-
nizing or choosing or gratifying. We simply listen and look. Beauty, then, is more 
passive than a cognition or than an action. Free play may be active to a certain 
extent, but the play is restful, relaxed. In a way, it’s like the mind dreaming when 
we’re resting. And the added benefit is we learn to forget our self-interest in the 
process.
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iii. The FORM of Purposiveness is the Source of Beauty.
To repeat: the form of purposiveness gives us disinterested pleasure. 
Form is the operative term here. Also, as mentioned earlier, purposiveness is 
what gives us our feeling of pleasure. Purposiveness is the source of our interest, 
form is the source of our disinterest. Purposiveness is the source of pleasure be-
cause there’s no concept at work, i.e., we don’t know what an object’s purpose is. 
Form is the source of disinterest because we can’t use what’s intrinsic to an ob-
ject. We don’t consume the form of a delicious recipe, we consume its extrinsic 
ingredients. Likewise, the extrinsic qualities of an object draw our interest. Bells, 
whistles, embellishments, flash are put on top of form to draw interest, to make 
us want to gratify. But it’s form that makes us behold. 
On a related note, the form of purposiveness doesn’t cause disinterested 
interest. It’s not a causal relationship. If beauty was an effect, beauty would be 
dependent and a posteriori. If beauty were a posteriori, it would not be a priori 
nor universal to every person. To say this another way, the beautiful does not de-
pend on experience. If it were, beauty would be learned, and if beauty were 
learned it would be conceptual, a human construct. 
So, the form of purposiveness doesn’t cause disinterested pleasure. It 
may put us in a purposive mind-state, but that mind-state is the pleasure. After 
all, purposiveness and disinterested interest both refer to not needing. A purpo-
sive mind-state (not naming, using, consuming) means to relax the cognitive fac-
ulties, allowing them to play freely. The spectacles of purposiveness (again, not 
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naming, using, consuming) is like an object with purposive form (unnameable, 
unusable, un-consumable). They’re alike as well as disinterested pleasure is 
alike as a purposive mind-state is pleasure without interest. Let me say this an-
other way. 
If disinterested (i.e., non-needy) pleasure were caused, it would be de-
pendent on an external force and would therefore be interested (i.e., needy). 
Needy pleasure is conditioned in time and space: an external force causes it 
(beginning), and if we consume too much of it, we want the activity to stop (end). 
But disinterested interest (not needing to know, use, or consume) by definition is 
an activity of rest complete, unconditioned, and perfect unto itself as it needs 
nothing. 
Whether we put on a pair of purposive “eye-glasses” or whether an object 
with purposive form puts us into a purposive mind-state, either way we need 
nothing else—and that is disinterested interest. Also, putting on those eye-glass-
es to appreciate purposive form quickens, strengthens, and reproduces our cog-
nitive powers. That is the pleasure, too. We want to persevere in this state-of-
mind. And we can’t have too much of it since it’s an intrinsic pleasure without 
self-gratification. 
So, purposiveness doesn’t name, use, or consume which is disinterested 
pleasure that needs nothing and desires no end which is purposive form that 
can’t be used or named. They’re the same, not separate events in time and 
space.
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iv. Four Parts of the Third Moment.
Kant makes four points about our relation to an object of beauty:
1. Form is essential. Form is essential to feeling disinterested plea-
sure.
2. Beauty is NOT “confused” knowledge. Our relation to an object 
of beauty isn’t a matter of “confused knowledge.” Beauty isn’t 
knowledge. Beauty is beauty.
 
3. Purposiveness frees our imagination. The form of purposive-
ness frees our imagination, and that is the pleasure. We’ll see how 
below.
 
4. The “ideal” of beauty. There’s a specific form of purposiveness 
that causes disinterested pleasure in us.
Let’s look at each of those. They’re fascinating.  
a. Form Is Essential.
First, Kant discusses why form is essential to disinterested pleasure. He 
first divides aesthetic judgment into two. He says, just as theoretical judgment is 
divided into “empirical theoretical judgment” (i.e., understanding) and “pure theo-
retical judgment” (i.e., reason), there is “empirical aesthetic judgment” (i.e., the 
agreeable) and “pure aesthetic judgment” (i.e., the beautiful). “Empirical aesthetic 
judgment” is a posteriori and depends on sensation. “Pure aesthetic judgment” is 
a priori and depends on form. 
“Empirical aesthetic judgments” that depend on sensation aren’t uni-
versal. This is just the agreeable. Examples of the agreeable include preferring 
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the sound of the piano over the violin, or preferring the color green over the color 
pink. These can’t belong to all subjects, nor should they be. Some prefer some 
sensations over others. And that’s okay. As we’ve said, this is just personal pref-
erence.
But “pure aesthetic judgments” that depend on form are universal (and 
do belong to all subjects). This is the beautiful. As a warning, what Kant says 
next is a sorely misunderstood part of his aesthetics. On a closer look, the argu-
ment makes an interesting point. Here’s what he says. 
If a sound is nothing more than vibration of air, or color nothing more than 
the way light hits an object, then these aren’t intrinsic to beauty. Rather the form 
beneath the sound of an instrument and beneath the color of, say, a statue is. In 
other words, it’s not the sound of the piano that makes a piece of music beautiful. 
It’s the arrangement of sound, the proportions, the design. Whether we hear a 
Bach fugue on a harpsichord or a piano, the way Bach designed his music re-
mains. People can agree or disagree which sound they prefer to hear the fugue 
on. That’s personal preference. There’s something deeper and universal: Bach’s 
design. So the form of Bach’s fugue is the true source of the music’s beauty.
We can see this in reverse, too. Things that lack form or clear shape we 
usually call “ugly.” For example, Quasimodo was de-formed. A 2016 National 
Geographic magazine cover showed de-formed vegetables and the title said 
“How Ugly Vegetables Can Save The World.” We say a person who’s in shape is 
beautiful because their body has shape. We say a pianist plays a passage of 
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music beautifully because the passage has shape. We say a dancer dances well 
when her lines have shape, too. 
But scholars have raised questions about Kant’s views on “ugliness.” They 
note Kant speaks little about negative judgments of ugliness, he focuses almost 
exclusively on positive judgments of beauty. Does Kant allow for an experience 
of ugliness? If he can, is the pleasure interested or disinterested? 
Paul Guyer argues Kant allows us to feel displeasure in the ugly, but his 
controversial argument is those judgments always involve interest.  When we 126
see a pile of dung, we want move away from it out of interest. Hannah Ginsborg 
agrees with Guyer that Kant allows us to judge something to be ugly, but dis-
agrees we never feel disinterested displeasure. She thinks our judgments of ugli-
ness can sometimes be pure. The reason is, if in certain contexts we expect 
something to be beautiful and it’s not, we can judge it to be ugly with disinterest-
ed displeasure. She does acknowledge we feel interested displeasure when an 
object is potentially harmful or disgusting, though.127
The title of David Shier’s article, “Why Kant Finds Nothing Ugly” may take 
things too far. Kant does allow for judgments of ugliness. He says so. In section 
48, he says fine art can represent the “ugly” in a beautiful way. Specifically he 
says, “Furies, diseases, devastations of war . . . can be very beautifully de-
scribed, nay even represented in pictures.” And he goes on to say one kind of 
ugliness can’t be depicted beautifully—an object that “excites disgust.” If an artist 
 Ginsborg, 13.126
 Ibid., 12-3.127
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accurately depicts a pile of dung, we’ll take it to be dung and feel disgust. Only 
indirect representations of the disgusting might be beautiful.
The point is, Kant acknowledges there are “ugly” and “disgusting” objects. 
He also says we “feel displeasure.” If a purposive form gives us disinterested in-
terest, then objects without form or purposiveness would make us feel displea-
sure. 
Kant never answers the question whether that displeasure is sometimes 
disinterested or always interested. We could say Kant (in the quoted passage 
above) distinguishes between two kinds of ugly: a) what we find morally offensive 
like war, and b) what we find physically disagreeable like sickness, which excites 
disgust.  It would seem interest is involved in both kinds of ugliness but delving 128
into that topic may be better left to another paper.        
Kant’s real point seems to be form gives an object its beauty—not its sur-
face razzle-dazzle. Flashy sensations can attract us to a beautiful object, but 
flash appeals to self-interest. It gratifies us, provokes desire, appeals to “me.” So, 
performing Shakespeare’s Hamlet with dazzling lighting and bright-colored cos-
tumes appeals to my interest, but it’s Shakespeare’s design of his plays that is 
purposive and that refers “me” to something larger than “me.” It’s no wonder, 
then, why Hollywood films with dazzling special effects can still leave us feeling 
empty if there’s no story (form of purposiveness). Spectacle delights, form nour-
ishes.
 Paul Guyer, “Kant and the Purity of the Ugly,” Kant e-Prints – Vol. 3, n. 3, 128
2004, ftp://ftp.cle.unicamp.br/pub/kant-e-prints/vol.3-n.3-2004.pdf, 20.
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But Kant thinks there’s a place for sensation, spectacle, charm. He says 
charm (which is extrinsic) can be added to form to enhance it, enliven it. In other 
words, charm might be like a woman putting makeup on over the form of her 
face, or a man putting clothes on over the form of his body. Kant’s point is: 
makeup and clothes aren’t the source of the beauty. They may catch our atten-
tion and enhance the form underneath, but the question is what’s the form like 
underneath? Even if the face or the body underneath had blemishes (or had per-
fect complexion), the real beauty lies in the form, not the outer surface.
So, Kant’s not against charm. It’s just if we’re not careful, charm can dis-
tract us from form. He gives an example of a gold frame. If we rely too heavily on 
extrinsic factors, it’s like putting a garish, gold frame around a picture. The frame 
distracts us from the beautiful painting itself. He says a better relationship be-
tween the agreeable and the beautiful would be putting a frame around a painting 
that draws the eye to the painting rather than to the frame. 
The overall point is, form allows us to feel disinterested interest. Form 
refers us to purposiveness rather than to me, my interest. And purposive forms 
allow pleasure to be universal. Charm captures our desire, but to feel free when 
beholding an object, the sensations must only supplement, ornament. They must 
not be the center of attention. That way beauty doesn’t gratify or provoke desire 
(like an addiction), we take pleasure in a form (good in itself) without needing the 
object. 
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b. Beauty is NOT “Confused” Knowledge. 
Second, Kant discusses how our relation to an object of beauty isn’t a 
matter of “confused knowledge.” Like makeup, utility is also external to an object 
of beauty. So, utility doesn’t determine beauty either. If utility did, then we would 
understand an object conceptually as its use. But Kant raises this question: does 
the internal “perfection” of an object cause us to experience it as beautiful? 
Here’s an example of what Kant means. Let’s take a piece of music by 
Bach. If we were to analyze it, take the music apart, see how mathematically 
symmetrical it is, we might say this work of art was “internally perfect.” So, his 
question is, is it the internally perfect form of an object what makes it beautiful or 
something else? After all, Kant had just finished arguing form is the true source of 
beauty. 
Surprisingly, Kant’s answer is no: internal perfection is not the source of 
beauty. Let’s take the Bach example again to illustrate why. 
We listen to a Bach fugue and can’t help but be moved by it. “Beautiful,” 
we say. Let’s say we’re not trained in music so we don’t have the background to 
analyze it and take it apart to understand why the music works so “perfectly.” This 
means our experience of the music was just an unclear understanding, or con-
fused knowledge. 
Let’s now ask Kant’s question again. Are all experiences of beauty con-
fused knowledge? When we don’t conceptualize a Bach fugue, we’re able to en-
joy the piece more and feel its beauty. But when we begin breaking it down to 
understand its internal perfection and structure, we no longer feel its beauty. So 
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does that mean beauty is just a primitive stepping stone towards the real goal 
which is understanding?
Again, Kant’s answer is no. That would mean aesthetic judgment is a func-
tion of confused concepts, but concepts nonetheless. But beauty has its own 
unique identity or value. It’s meant to be enjoyed without concepts. Enjoying na-
ture or an artwork without conceptualizing it has value in itself.
So, Kant’s answer: beauty isn’t confused knowledge. Beauty isn’t  sup-
posed to yield knowledge. The only role understanding plays when we feel disin-
terested pleasure is recognizing I’m feeling disinterested pleasure. Beauty isn’t 
meant to induce us to ethical action either. Beauty simply allows us to see an ob-
ject as appearance but also as more than appearance. 
Okay, fine, but what does the understanding do during an aesthetic judg-
ment? I said it recognizes “I’m feeling disinterested pleasure.” But isn’t under-
standing’s job is to apply concepts? Does understanding then just stop doing 
this? Ted Cohen offers an interesting answer in his article “Three Problems in 
Kant’s Aesthetics.” 
In that article, Cohen notes how strange it is understanding doesn’t seem 
to be doing anything. For example, take a rose. Imagination represents a red 
rose to understanding and understanding says, “This rose is red.”  But in an 129
aesthetic judgment understanding isn’t supposed to apply concepts. What? If un-
derstanding isn’t applying concepts in an aesthetic judgment, what’s it doing? Af-
 Ted Cohen, “Three Problems in Kant’s Aesthetics,” British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 129
42, No. 1, January 2002, 1-2.
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ter all, the rose is a flower, red, possessed of petals and so forth.  Does the un130 -
derstanding not recognize these all of a sudden?
Here’s the idea Cohen proposes. He dismisses the idea understanding 
refuses to apply concepts because that describes what understanding is not do-
ing rather than what it is doing. So, he proposes this idea instead.
Maybe understanding applies all concepts of that rose at once: “it’s a 
flower, it’s red, it’s possessed of petals.” In other words, an aesthetic judgment 
sees a beautiful object in its completeness, all concepts at once. But this means 
understanding is at work endlessly. Cohen asks, would that busy process ever 
cohere to a single aesthetic judgment?131
Cohen’s answer is, yes. By letting the object display all of itself, that’s 
when we see it as beautiful. Said another way, an aesthetic judgment is when the 
understanding doesn’t apply one concept but it continuously inspects, like a “vi-
brating” perception.  This may fit in nicely when Kant observes an aesthetic 132
judgment “quickens” our cognitive faculties. But there’s one problem, Cohen 
notes. Any and every object would then be beautiful.
One possible problem with Cohen’s argument is he assumes understand-
ing is doing something. Kant says the power to judge is the same as the power to 
think, but in an aesthetic judgment, judgment is “passive,” at rest, at play, not at 
work. Let me say that again. The act of subsuming particulars under concepts is 
 Ibid., 2.130
 Ibid., 3.131
 Ibid., 4.132
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by judgment, not understanding. Understanding (with a capital “U”) refers to sen-
sibility, imagination, understanding, and judgment working together to make a 
logical judgment. But understanding (with a lower case “u”), which is a part of 
Understanding, refers to our concepts. Within Understanding, judgment puts intu-
itions under concepts and understanding refers to our concepts. Cohen seems to 
mistake concepts with applying concepts. Applying concepts is judgment’s job, 
not understanding’s. Understanding (with a lower case “u”) is just the collection of 
concepts that makes up understanding. In that light, it may still be possible for 
judgment to rest from subsuming particulars under concepts, as it can do other 
things besides apply concepts. 
Let me give an illustration. 
Imagine Understanding as a factory that must put different gadgets into 
their correct boxes. The parts that make up a gadget we might call the intuitions 
we gather from the external world. The receiver of the parts we might call sensi-
bility. The worker who puts those parts together into a gadget we might call imag-
ination. The shelf that contains different categories of boxes we might call under-
standing. And the inspector who puts the gadgets into their correct box we might 
call judgment. 
Now, when judgment is on the clock putting gadgets into their correct box-
es, he must abide by the factory’s rules. Here judgment is an employee of the 
factory of “Understanding.” The rules judgment must abide by are the laws of na-
ture. The factory as a whole, then, pumps out logical judgments and creates 
products of knowledge. 
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But all things need rest. When judgment rests, i.e., when he reflects, he 
doesn’t have to play by Understanding’s rules anymore. On break, he can work 
for himself now. His rule? Don’t categorize, don’t use, don’t consume, i.e., put on 
the goggles of “purposiveness.” In other words, relax and ask, “do I feel disinter-
ested pleasure?” If so, judgment and his co-worker imagination gain freedom to 
play with the parts of a gadget (intuitions). They don’t have to fix these parts ac-
cording to the factory’s strict rules. The parts can just be. Judgment enjoys the 
patterns underlying intuitions and enjoys watching the possible play between 
imagination and understanding. 
For example, when we turn that picture of Einstein upside down and relax 
our judgment, we no longer have to name his “eye, nose, mouth.” We’re allowed 
to see shapes, lines, and the relationships between them. We can see different 
animals in the clouds without identifying a “cirrus” cloud or a “stratus” cloud. We 
can see different viewpoints in an M.C. Escher drawing. We can see a hidden 
image in a “Magic Eye” poster. We can enjoy the moon and stars without identify-
ing them as “astronomical bodies.” Judgment can relax and just watch the play. 
It’s fun. He feels free, and so he feels like he could do this forever. When judg-
ment relaxes and calms so he can simply feel disinterested pleasure (rather than 
fixing gadgets to exact boxes), he pumps out aesthetic judgments and, if that 
judgment belongs to a person who has developed a certain skill in a craft, he 
could communicate that experience of beauty through artworks. 
So, in this perspective it’s not understanding that’s doing, it’s judgment. 
And it’s possible to let the boxes go empty and to just enjoy patterns (or forms) of 
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intuition without naming them. It’s possible because concepts don’t do anything. 
The factory worker (judgment) is the one who decides to take a concept off the 
shelf or not. Imagination brings intuitions together and can use the intuitions to 
play with concepts in free (not literal) ways (like seeing animals in the clouds). 
Judgment enjoys the play and enjoys witnessing the patterns (forms) themselves 
of the intuitions.
Judgment can still feel like life in the factory as drudgery, though. He might 
still ask himself at some point, “is there any higher meaning to life?” Thankfully, 
outside and behind the factory of “Understanding” is a temple called “Reason” 
and judgment can visit anytime to answer those kinds of questions. 
The inside of the temple is sublime. There’s an ancillary room inside called 
“Metaphysics” but the central space is called “Ethics.” Inside the “Metaphysics” 
room is a library filled with books called “ideas” about what might exist beyond 
existence—they’re ideas, not realities. Judgment can read about those ideas like 
about God, soul, freedom. 
Inside “Ethics,” the chapel area, is an altar called “Moral Law.” The altar 
represents the freedom that may exist beyond existence. To feel the freedom of 
beyond, judgment must abide by the Moral Law in his actions. The idea is, the 
more judgment abides by the Moral Law, the more judgment can taste (not just 
speculate about) freedom.   
My overall point is, judgment is the actor, not understanding. Not only is 
the power of judgment the same as the power of thinking, but the power of think-
ing is the same as the power to choose. Judgment can choose to fix gadgets into 
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their correct boxes, or he can choose to take a break, or he can choose to visit 
the temple outside the factory and abide by the Moral Law. As thinker and 
chooser, perhaps even consciousness (I’ll explain below), judgment mediates 
Understanding and Reason, especially when he’s on break working for himself. 
In these aesthetic judgments, concepts and ideas can interact with each other.
If I may, let me attempt one last illustration to demonstrate how that inter-
action between concepts and ideas is possible, and also to further illustrate how 
understanding “does” nothing during a reflective judgment. Again, understanding 
does nothing because understanding refers to concepts. Judgment is the actor. 
And when judgment reflects, it rests from knowing, allowing imagination to play 
with concepts (i.e., to not be bound and determined by them) as well as open up 
to ideas. Okay, this is an illustration of Kant’s idea that intuitions are brought un-
der understanding in general—this might be how that could look like.
Imagine a lantern that consists of a lamp and a flashlight attached.  The 133
lantern as a whole represents judgment. The flashlight represents logical judg-
ment and the lamp represents reflective judgment. The lamp can light up a whole 
room, but a flashlight brings specific objects (intuitions) into clarity. When we 
concentrate on a task, our attention narrows. This is like judgment fixing gadgets 
into their correct box. But when we watch a good movie, the flashlight no longer 
narrows on a specific object. We allow the flashlight to lose itself in the wider light 
of the lamp (though the flashlight may still shine in the background). In fact, not 
only does the flashlight become less specific in its scope, the lamp loses its 
 I got this image of a lamp with a flashlight attached from Serge Kahili King in his book 133
Mastering Your Hidden Self: A Guide to the Huna Way, (Wheaton: Quest Books, 2006), 51. 
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awareness of anything outside the movie, too. This adds to our pleasure because 
we don’t feel as confined anymore. A movie critic isn’t so lucky, though. He has to 
dim the lamp and keep the flashlight in the foreground on certain aspects of the 
film such as performance and style. 
But when the narrow scope of the flashlight loses itself in the wider scope 
of the lamp, we hear the melody of a song more and don’t focus on its words so 
much. We sense angry body language and pay less attention to a person’s "nice" 
sounding words. We sense what words express in a poem rather than take them 
literally. We sense the visual symbolism in, say, a Stanley Kubrick film without 
being conscious of the circular shapes he might use to express uneasiness. We 
become aware of color, shape, texture in an environment without having to name 
“mountain,” “tree,” “sky.” 
These two lights of judgment can work together, too. A martial artist can 
focus on his opponent while being aware of the whole environment. A good driver 
can engage in a conversation while being aware of other cars and pedestrians in 
general. 
The point is, the flashlight loses its narrow focus in the generalized light of 
the lamp, even though the flashlight still shines in the background. In logical 
judgments, the flashlight is focused so it can fix an object into a clear and distinct 
concept. In aesthetic judgments, the lamp widens its scope to allow patterns of 
intuitions by themselves to flow (i.e., shapes, rhythmic lines, symmetries, propor-
tions, harmonies, gradation of light and shadows, colors) without our consciously 
naming them. The lamp’s wide scope may even allow images, feelings, memo-
 100
ries, perhaps concepts without content, and even “ideas” from Reason to flow, 
too. In the wider scope of an aesthetic judgment, concepts and ideas interact.
Again, the light of the whole lantern might be seen as consciousness, as 
light allows us to see. In an earlier section I said the disinterested pleasure of an 
aesthetic judgment is an activity of rest. This may be how. The light of conscious-
ness still shines even when it rests during an aesthetic judgment. Judgment sees 
intuitions and its concepts or ideas and decides how to bring them together. So, 
subsumption—not always correct but still a kind of decision—is by judgment. Ex-
act subsumption doesn’t matter as much in an aesthetic judgment. In any event, 
an aesthetic judgment might be general awareness and a logical judgment might 
be focused attention. Judgment can decide which light to use, logical or aesthet-
ic, in addition decide how to apply its concepts to know and its ideas to act. 
In either way, judgment shines its light on the external world and to a cer-
tain extent on the internal world (only to thoughts and feelings rooted in sensible 
experience). Again, judgment’s flashlight (logical judgment) has a narrow scope 
and determines facts. Its lamp (aesthetic judgment) has a wider scope—which 
allows a cascade of thoughts. When the lamp shines, the flashlight's narrow fo-
cus blends (and sometimes sinks) into its broader light.
So, the question isn’t what understanding is doing during an aesthetic 
judgment. Understanding (with a capital “U”) refers to rules, and understanding 
refers to concepts. The real question is what judgment is doing. And according to 
Kant, aesthetic judgment relaxes its logical capacity, allowing imagination, intu-
itions, concepts, and ideas freedom of play without filling concepts in a fixed way.
 101
When I raised this question about what understanding does at the outset 
of this discussion, I said if judgment “does” anything “literal” (in the sense of 
knowing) during an aesthetic judgment, judgment knows it feels disinterested 
pleasure. That’s how judgment can tell whether an object is beautiful. And yes, 
judgment can have knowledge of this “internal” process because pleasure is a 
sensible experience. But outside knowledge of disinterested interest, aesthetic 
judgments know nothing, achieve nothing, consume nothing. There’s freedom 
involved in this disinterested pleasure. And an object becomes free from concept 
and utility, too.
But does that mean any and every object can be beautiful? No. Not all ob-
jects have a purposive form that makes us feel disinterested pleasure. Some ob-
ject excite disgust. Some objects have a purposive form and return us to feeling 
disinterested pleasure immediately, without our having to think about it (in fact, 
we often don’t know why we feel it). But other times we have to put on the gog-
gles of purposiveness, relax our logical judgment, and allow ourselves to feel dis-
interested pleasure at, say, the sight of a rose. 
That is, I refrain from naming the rose. Even if I say “this rose is red,” I 
wouldn't experience the rose anymore. I also refrain from picking up the rose. If I 
picked up a rose, it would begin to die. Instead, I relax my ability to know and act 
so I can appreciate the rose. In that case I begin to approach it “morally,” as if it 
were an end-in-itself. Putting aside concepts and desire, I experience a kind of 
freedom, even when I feel stuck in the factory. And the more I exercise reflective 
judgment, the more I may look beyond the factory to seek the Moral Law.
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c. Purposiveness Frees Our Imagination.
Third, Kant discusses how the form of purposiveness frees our imagina-
tion and how that is the pleasure itself. He does this by distinguishing between 
“free beauty” and “dependent beauty.” 
Dependent beauty is when we feel disinterested interest, but when we 
also have a concept of an object. To take the Bach example again, when a 
trained musician feels pleasure listening to the music and understands what 
makes it good, there’s disinterested pleasure but also a concept is at work. He’s 
dependent on a concept to enjoy the music.
Other examples of dependent beauty: when we see a beautiful person. 
We feel the beauty but we also know what the thing is. We know the concept. 
Dependent beauty is a combination of intellectual (or the good) and aesthetic 
judgment. If makeup on a pleasing face is a combination of the agreeable and 
the beautiful, then knowing what an object is, is a combination of the good and 
the beautiful. In both cases, these are examples of dependent beauties. They’re 
less “pure” versions of beauty.  
Free beauty is when we have no concept or knowledge of an object. The 
object represents nothing. It has no intrinsic meaning to us. Aristotle gave a won-
derful example of this, again in his Poetics. In chapter 4, he describes someone 
who’s never “seen the original, the pleasure will be due to… the execution, the 
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coloring, or some such cause,”  i.e., we still feel its beauty even if we don’t 134
know what the object is. To take an example from the sitcom Seinfeld, if a child 
hasn’t met anyone like the character George Constanza yet, the child might still 
laugh at the “execution” of how Jason Alexander portrays the character without 
understanding the concept of why his portrayal is so funny. Again, we can look at 
an artwork without understanding it, but still feel its beauty.
Kant gives another excellent example to clarify the difference between 
free and dependent beauty. When we look at the beauty of a flower and also say, 
“that’s the reproductive organ” we’re reflecting on the object as dependent beau-
ty. But when we look at a flower without concepts or labels and notice the rhythm 
of its meandering lines without the use of concepts, this is a purer aesthetic ex-
perience. It’s free beauty. 
Art teachers use a similar technique to help students learn how to draw. If 
students have a difficult time drawing a photograph of Einstein, for example, the 
teacher turns the photo upside down and has the student draw that. Students 
usually have a better time drawing the photo because they’re no longer looking 
through concepts such as nose, eyes, mouth, hair. They’re forced to pay atten-
tion just to the shapes without concepts. In a similar way, Kant argues that paying 
attention to shapes, lines, the relations between them without needing to know 
their intrinsic meaning is an aesthetic experience. Perhaps aesthetic judgment is 
what it means to look at the world like an artist and logical judgment would be to 
look at the world more like a scientist. 
 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S. H. Butcher (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), 56, chapter 134
4.
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Also, in the General Remark following his discussion of the four moments, 
Kant adds beauty doesn’t derive from stiff regularity. Stiff regularity (close to 
mathematical regularity) lessens free play and contracts the imagination. We’re 
also more apt to conceptualize. A charming example Kant gives of “stiff regulari-
ty” is a pepper garden with regular rows and parallel lines. Another example 
might be a plain white wall. Or perhaps a suburb. Or playing Bach’s Prelude in C 
minor with such regularity (and without contour of line), it sounds like a washing 
machine. Beauty needs variety, spontaneity (as well as structure). Variety charms 
the imagination and gives imagination scope for play. A bird’s song, for example, 
has more freedom and engages the imagination more than a human voice strain-
ing to meet strict rules. Too much mathematical regularity makes us grow tired. In 
addition to form, repetition, pattern, symmetry, motif, we need variety so the regu-
larity doesn’t become annoying. This is another paradox of beauty: beauty needs 
both structure and spontaneity.
In any event, free beauty gives more freedom to the imagination. This 
makes sense because if we’re beholden to and dependent on concepts, the un-
derstanding and sensation isn’t as free. Free from concepts, labels, words to 
contemplate purely the forms frees the imagination and understanding to play. 
That’s the true aesthetic pleasure (or disinterested interest). 
Once again, the free play of the imagination is the disinterested pleasure. 
Play doesn’t cause it. “Losing one’s self in the moment,” so to speak is aesthetic 
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pleasure.  The two are synonymous, entwined, inseparable. If the pleasure 135
were caused, it implies the activity happens and ends in a point of time, and the 
pleasure happens in another point of time and ends. In this view, the two are 
separate from each other. But sustained activity (feeling like you could do that 
activity forever) is what the disinterested pleasure is. Besides, if disinterested 
pleasure were caused, it would be dependent on an empirical experience, a pos-
teriori, and not universal. 
On a related note, why can’t we be content with an Epicurean view of 
beauty as simply pleasant? That’s “agreeable pleasure” where self-interest is in-
volved. Personal pleasure isn’t universal. The way we use the word “beauty” is to 
refer to an experience shared by everyone. For pleasure to be shared by every-
one, it must be apart from personal preference. But more importantly, universal 
beauty will also allow Kant to argue later that beauty is related to the freedom 
and universality of the moral law.  
d. “Ideal Beauty”
Fourth and last, Kant discusses where the “ideal” of beauty comes from, 
or what it is about the form of “purposiveness without purpose” that gives rise to 
disinterested interest. This is a difficult question to ask because to provide an 
ideal is to make beauty into a concept. Again, if beauty were conceptual, it would 
no longer be beautiful but mere knowledge. 
 When we’re “in the moment,” we lose track of time. In other words, we don’t want the 135
“state-of-mind” to end. This is one of the ways Kant defines the nature of pleasure, i.e., we want 
to persevere in that state. 
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Also, if we discovered this supposed ideal of beauty, it would allow aes-
thetic taste to be learned externally. We would learn it logically from an outside 
authority, like a teacher or book. The aesthetic experience wouldn’t arise sponta-
neously in a Subject. That kind of ideal might be universal like a conceptual truth 
but it would no longer be subjective. And beauty must be both universal and sub-
jective. 
So Kant says we can’t have an “external ideal” the way knowledge is ex-
ternal. Said another way, we can never know what underlies the appearance of a 
thing. So, ideal beauty can’t rest on rules but only on the pleasure one feels 
when the imagination is at play. But there is one case where we can come close 
to understanding what it is about “purposiveness without purpose” that gives rise 
to disinterested interest.   
Before Kant reveals what this case is, he asks if we arrive at this “ideal of 
beauty” a priori or empirically? In other words, is the ideal learned, or are we born 
with a type of internal compass that helps us determine what’s beautiful? Kant’s 
answer: beauty is a priori, the ability to judge aesthetically is born in every hu-
man. That looks ahead to the fourth moment, but for now Kant tells us in what 
case we can come close to understanding what it is about the form of “purpo-
siveness without purpose” that gives rise to disinterested interest.
The beautiful object we can come to understand the ideal of beauty in is in 
the human being, as we’re human ourselves.  To explain, Kant contrasts an “aes-
thetic normal idea” with an “aesthetic rational idea.” 
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The “aesthetic normal idea” comes from the play between imagination 
and understanding, and it’s empirical. Through experience and having many intu-
itions of human beings, we come to sense an ideal of beauty in the average. That 
is, if we average 1000s of human faces, the ideal of beauty is the mean between 
them all. We come to this ideal not through rules or concepts but through experi-
ence. It’s as if we imagine an archetype of form underlying the 1000s of particu-
lars, and we respond to the archetype.
The “aesthetic rational ideal” (i.e., an idea from reason) comes from the 
play between imagination and reason and may be purer. When there’s a visible 
expression of moral ideas governing a person inwardly—whether it’s benevo-
lence, equanimity, strength, femininity—we feel beauty. So we feel the beauty of 
a woman because she expresses a certain moral idea. Same with the beauty of 
a man. Batman may be aesthetic in the sublime way he demonstrates courage. 
Catwoman may be aesthetic in the feminine way she moves, or when she de-
cides to help a fellow human in need even though she’d rather steal that dia-
mond. This kind of “rational” ideal of beauty is found only with humans because 
according to Kant the human is the animal that deals with moral choices. “Aes-
thetic rational ideas,” then, come less from the form and more from (rational) 
“ideas.” And the pleasure we feel derives from imagination in a free play with 
reason.
The point is, we relate to the form of purposiveness by feeling free play of 
imagination. That play is the disinterested interest that every human feels inter-
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nally. Kant’s last moment of modality is the climax, the sum of the previous three 
moments. Beauty is an “aesthetic sense” every human has.
4. Fourth Moment of Modality: Common Sense
 
Modality is a logical classification that asserts or denies the a) possibility, 
b) impossibility, c) contingency, or d) necessity of a proposition. Of these, Kant’s 
fourth moment claims the mode of beauty is necessary. But beauty has a special 
kind of necessity. 
Beauty isn’t theoretically necessary or practically necessary. It’s not theo-
retically necessary because aesthetic judgments produce no universal knowl-
edge. It’s not practically necessary because aesthetic judgments produce no eth-
ical action. But beauty is still necessary. It’s necessary in the sense that if a per-
son describes something as beautiful, everyone ought to agree. The universal 
agreement doesn’t derive from concepts or from experience. Everyone must 
agree on their own volition. Each person feels disinterested pleasure without be-
ing told. Beauty is aesthetically necessary because it makes a person aware of 
the purposive form in an object.
Again, the assent of beauty is subjective but it’s necessarily universal. 
When we describe something as beautiful we say no one else can be of a differ-
ent opinion, yet this “opinion” rests on a subjective feeling. In other words, beauty 
isn’t a private feeling, but a public feeling. This isn’t to say everyone will agree. A 
few might feel so anxious at a given moment, they can’t enjoy a sunrise. Rather, 
this is to say everyone ought to agree with us. That is, the anxious person can 
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still feel beauty if the anxiety (or interest) wasn’t there. So, beauty is necessary 
and universal. In fact, the necessity says more about us humans than an “object” 
of beauty. It says an aesthetic judgment is a “common sense.”
Common sense here doesn’t mean logic or know-how, the way we usually 
use the term “common sense.” Kant calls that “common understanding.” For 
Kant, common sense means every human has an aesthetic ability that operates 
in the same way. Said another way, every human being can sense beauty, as if 
the ability to see beauty is part of our hardware as human beings. To be human 
is to have an aesthetic sense. To be human is to sense the supersensible under-
lying the sensible realm.
I use the term “aesthetic sense” because Shaftesbury used that term, and 
this idea most likely is a borrowing of that idea. As we had discussed, Shaftes-
bury’s idea is, each human person is born with an aesthetic (and moral) sense at 
birth, a priori. Kant seems to follow him in asserting that if each animal has a 
unique gift, perhaps the human gift is the ability to sense beauty. Kant will argue 
that beauty is a symbol of morality. We’ll see how in a moment. For now, this aes-
thetic sense may be the beginning of our ability to know and to act morally and 
Kant hints it may also bridge these two powers together.
i. Kant’s Proof of Common Sense.
Kant develops the idea of common sense after discussing the sublime in 
sections 30-40. Then he turns once more to common sense after discussing fine 
art and genius in sections 55-58. Common sense sets up his claim in the final 
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two sections of “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” 59 and 60, that beauty is a 
“symbol” of morality, and the mediating link between theory and practice. 
The reason he spends extra time developing common sense is because it 
sums up all four Moments. By arguing that common sense exists in every hu-
man, Kant argues beauty is valid, i.e., both universal and subjective. If he can 
argue this convincingly he can resolve the antagonism between freedom and de-
terminism and link theory and practice together. He planted the seeds of his ar-
gument already in his initial discussion of the Four Moments. But here’s how he 
develops his argument further.
In general, judgments are mental acts that bring a particular (e.g. my dog 
Elsa) under a universal (e.g. a golden retriever). As we discussed already, Kant’s 
earlier work suggested our ability to judge was as a mere processor. In aesthetic 
judgments, judgment now has a principle of it own, purposiveness. 
Purposiveness allows us to listen. Normally, we don’t approach an object 
as purposive. More often we use judgment to know and to make choices. For ex-
ample, we apply some universal to a particular and we’re done. But in the case of 
the beautiful, we’re not done so fast—there’s no concept involved so we can’t 
just apply a concept and be done with it. An object of beauty or approaching an 
object aesthetically makes us stop, look and listen. This makes sense. We be-
come aware of the object as something more than its appearance. Like Shaftes-
bury might have said, that’s the beginning of curiosity and morality.
Kant’s four moments set limitations on aesthetic judgments. The first limi-
tation: aesthetic judgments must involve no self-interest. We feel pleasure but we 
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don’t want to consume or to possess. The second limitation: aesthetic judgments 
must be universal yet subjective. It’s a subjective feeling that doesn’t look 
through the lens of a concept yet it’s a feeling that also belongs to every person. 
The third limitation: the object’s form seems like it has purpose but it’s a purpose 
we can never know or use. The fourth limitation: the beautiful is an aesthetic in-
stinct or “common sense” every human has. We all have the ability a priori to see 
beauty, even if self-interest might sometimes blind us to it.
“Common sense” belongs to each human because the faculties of under-
standing, imagination, and sensibility are involved—and those faculties are 
present in every human a priori. So, the existence of “common sense” hinges on 
the universality of understanding and imagination, and the free play between 
them. In other words, all of us have understanding and imagination. All of us ex-
perience the play between these. That makes beauty universally valid. Said an-
other way, the same universal faculties involved in cognition are also involved in 
aesthetic judgments, except they’re in play or at rest rather than in labor. Beauty 
is the yin (rest) and cognition is the yang (work). Let me take a moment to under-
score this point, because it’s an important one.
Understanding, imagination, and sensibility are present a priori in all hu-
man beings. In cognitions, i.e., when we come to know something, understanding 
and imagination labor: we subsume intuitions under concepts. In aesthetic judg-
ments, the same understanding and imagination are involved. The difference is, 
rather than the two laboring, the two are playing. So, those universal activities 
are still involved in beauty—making beauty as universally valid as cognitions. 
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Again, beauty releases us from cognitive labor. It’s like a holiday. But 
there’s as much value in this as in cognition. Cognitive labor is limiting: to arrive 
at truth as we must accurately subsume facts (intuitions) under their appropriate 
categories. But in beauty, we’re allowed to go outside the “lines” (so to speak) of 
fact. The “free play” we feel in aesthetic judgments produces a cascade of 
thoughts and feelings. And it’s so pleasurable, we don’t want that state-of-mind to 
end. 
Here’s the other crucial value of free play. Free play recognizes the super-
sensible underlying the sensible. This may be another paradox of beauty. In 
beauty we see the sensible and supersensible not divorced from each other, but 
bound as a unity. This in turn allows reason (looking beyond to the supersensible 
realm of freedom) and understanding (looking around us in the sensible realm of 
determinism) to interact with each other. 
But Kant’s point about common sense is this. Beauty is a subjective plea-
sure that’s universal to everyone. Again, how? 
Imagination, sensibility, understanding, reason, play belong to everyone. 
These are universals. The play happens in the recognition of the supersensible 
underlying the sensible. That’s universal, too. The pleasure we feel in the play of 
our cognitive faculties having recognized the supersensible is apart from self-in-
terest. Interest that’s not selfish (or a personal preference) is also universal. 
Therefore, beauty is universal and the common sense—the ability to experience 
beauty—exists in every human being.
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Moreover, common sense is universal because it bridges theory and prac-
tice for every human being. When we want to know, we apply understanding to 
nature, but knowledge is limited to sensible nature. When we want to decide, we 
apply reason to the moral law of the supersensible realm, and in the process we 
become freer from the sensible realm. Common sense (aesthetic judgment) 
looks at a sensible object that could be determined by our concepts but instead 
looks at it with a sense of freedom (free play is free after all). And we use all fac-
ulties: understanding, imagination, judgment, and reason. Appreciating a beauti-
ful object is like understanding but not quite, and is like reason but not quite. 
That’s why aesthetic reflection allows reason and understanding to interact.
Reason gets especially involved in our experience of “the sublime.” Unfor-
tunately, space prevents me from delving into this exciting idea (as well as Kant’s 
intriguing ideas about how fine art is created). Let’s then skip to the climax of the 
“Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”: how Kant links beauty with morality. 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CHAPTER 5. 
“BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY”
CHAPTER 5: “BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY” 
In section 59 where Kant says that beauty is a symbol of morality, Kant 
begins by defining what a symbol is first. 
A. Defining symbol
1. Hypotyposis
Kant writes that “symbol” falls under the broader heading of “hypotyposis.” 
Hypotyposis comes from the Greek hypo, “under” and typosis, “mold.” Hypotypo-
sis, then, is a “presentation” or a sensible illustration. To give a clearer meaning 
Kant distinguishes “hypotyposis” from a “mark.” Marks (or signs) include words 
and numbers. They re-invoke a concept without an intuition. But a hypotyposis 
links a concept with an intuition. Kant next divides hypotyposis into two, “schema-
ta” and “symbols.” 
2. Schemata vs. Symbols
Schemata are direct presentations of a concept, i.e., empirical intuitions of 
a concept. In other words, they’re concrete examples to illustrate a concept. But 
symbols are different. 
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Symbols are indirect presentations of a concept. In other words, rather 
than demonstrate symbols directly, symbols use analogy. As a symbol, an intu-
ition performs a double function. 
First, an intuition and a concept are “thrown” together. The word symbol 
comes from the Greek sym “with” (or together) and ballein “to throw.” So, the et-
ymology aligns with Kant’s view that an intuition and concept are thrown together. 
But in the second function, a symbol differs from a schema. 
Second, the rule of an intuition is applied to another concept so that we 
can better see the rule of the concept, specifically a rational concept. We need 
symbols on behalf of rational concepts. Some ideas can’t be verified with exam-
ples from objective reality—because no intuition of a rational idea can be given. 
So, symbols use intuitions to present rational ideas indirectly, again by analogy.   
3. Examples of Symbols
The example (or in Kant’s terms a “schema”) Kant gives to illustrate sym-
bols is of a monarchical state. When governed justly by constitutional laws, we 
use the intuition (or image) of a living body to represent it. On the other hand, 
when governed unjustly by an individual’s absolute will, we might use the intuition 
(or image) of a machine or hand-mill to represent that. These aren’t direct one-to-
one examples. There’s no direct likeness between a despotic state and a hand-
mill. But when reflecting on the “rule” of a hand-mill we understand the “rule” of a 
despotic state better. 
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Other examples Kant uses: using the word “ground” to mean basis. Using 
the word “flow” rather than “follow.” Calling trees “majestic and stately,” plains 
“laughing and gay,” colors “innocent, modest, soft.” 
Again, symbols express concepts using intuitions by analogy, indirectly. 
It’s difficult to describe the nature of “yellow” to a blind person, but by using the 
analogous sensations of “warm” it eases the task. Again, we use symbols to ex-
press ideas where no concept or intuition could correspond. But by transferring 
reflection of an intuition to a rational idea, we better sense what the rational idea 
is.136
Interestingly, Kant says God can only be represented symbolically. God 
can’t be known through the properties of the understanding, like an objective re-
ality, like a direct demonstration of beings in the world. We use the word God as 
a symbol, an analogy, a label for what transcends intuitions and what is maxi-
mum. But to take the symbol God as a literal intuition is to commit the error of an-
thropomorphism—projecting ourselves onto what’s larger than ourselves, thus 
limiting it. “God” is just a symbol that points to something higher than us. Beauty 
also is a symbol that points us to the morally good.
 As a parenthetical comment, Freud took Schelling’s idea of the unconscious 136
and claimed it (the unconscious) communicated by means of symbols. For example, in 
dreams an image may appear to a dreamer that represents an underlying wish or fear 
(feelings that are deeper than concepts). Jung went a step further and thought the sym-
bols that make up myth—he called them archetypes—spring from the collective uncon-
scious. Finally, Nietzsche thought the Apollonian principle of art springs from the dream-
ing state of existence—implying fine art also uses symbols. The point is, dreams, myths, 
and the arts may use symbols because “rational ideas” can’t be presented any other 
way. 
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B. How beauty symbolizes morality
The morally good belongs to rational ideas to which no intuition is ade-
quate. The beautiful belongs to the realm of intuitions but points us toward some-
thing higher than mere intuitions. Through beautiful intuitions, we’re elevated 
above mere sensibility, above mere self-interested pleasure, above mere impres-
sions. Beauty, like a sign—something visible to all—is like an arrow pointing up 
(or down towards the depths, i.e., whatever is beyond appearance). 
The beautiful also links understanding and reason together. 
In other words, aesthetic judgment brings our higher cognitive faculties 
into accord. Said another way, aesthetic judgments don’t separate understanding 
and reason from each other, shutting off one in favor for the other. Rather, aes-
thetic judgment brings them into accord. Again, in science we rely on understand-
ing to focus on external phenomena and we often shut off reason (to stay close 
to evidence). In ethics, we rely more on reason, focus on internal freedom (or 
noumena) to transcend “scientific” understanding (and evidence). But in reflective 
judgment understanding, reason, and judgment are all on at the same time, in 
accord.
Here’s another way of saying that. When the faculty of judgment isn’t 
working to understand or isn’t working for reason to see beyond, but works for 
itself on its own terms, aesthetic judgment neither tries to determine nature nor 
determine the right course of action. Yet it includes both external nature and in-
ternal freedom. So, in beauty we experience the supersensible and the sensible 
bound into one, a single unity. Phenomena and noumena are no longer dichoto-
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mous. Neither are reason and understanding shut off from each other. As a quick 
side note, there’s an analogous idea in the Buddhist idea of the Eight-fold path. 
1. Comparison with the Eightfold Path
The eight practices in Buddha’s Fourth Noble Truth are often listed in a 
linear way, but they operate more like a circle, entwined. Aesthetic judgment 
seems to link understanding and reason in a similar way. Here’s the analogy. 
The eight practices can be divided into three headings: (a) Wisdom or the 
intellect, (b) Ethical Conduct or the heart, (c) Mental Discipline or the attitude un-
derlying wisdom and ethical conduct.  “Wisdom” encompasses Right Under137 -
standing and Right Thought. Like Kant’s understanding (and reason in its meta-
physical function), the focus of these two practices is to understand. “Compas-
sion” encompasses Right Action, Right Speech, and Right Livelihood. Like Kant’s 
reason, the three practices focus on action and relating with fellow beings. “Men-
tal discipline” encompasses Right Mindfulness (or Attention), Right Effort, and 
Right Concentration. Like Kant’s judgment, these three practices focus neither on 
understanding nor on action but are a kind of listening. Likewise, Kant’s beautiful 
is a type of reflectiveness, a  “paying attention to,” or listening. 
 Walpola Rahula, What The Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 46-7.137
 119
Table 5.1.   Buddha’s Eightfold Path vs. Kant’s Three Faculties 
Most importantly, Mental Discipline bridges Wisdom and Ethical Conduct 
together. Reflective judgment neither understands, nor chooses. Rather it listens 
without concepts to see a thing as if it were a “thing-in-itself.” Reflectiveness is 
involved when we understand as well as when we act. Aesthetic judgment links 
them together in a similar way that attitude links intellect and heart in the eight-
fold path.   
Kant ends section 59 (“Beauty as the symbol of morality”) by showing four 
ways beauty is analogous with the good, while taking care to show their differ-
ences, too. 
Buddha’s Eightfold Path Kant’s Three Faculties
A. Wisdom (or intellect)
1. Right Understanding
2. Right Thought
A. Understanding (knowledge) and Reason 
(metaphysics) or Logical Judgment
B. Ethical Conduct (or the heart)
3. Right Action
4. Right Speech
5. Right Livelihood
B. Reason (ethics) or Moral Judgment
C. Mental Discipline (or attitude)
1. Right Mindfulness (or attention)
2. Right Effort
3. Right Concentration 
C. Reflective Judgment (aesthetics)
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C. Comparing Morality with Beauty
Interestingly these four ways look like Kant’s four moments:
Table 5.2.   Beauty vs. Morality—Similarities and Differences 
 1. The beautiful isn’t an a posteriori empirical law. As we saw, beauty 
can’t be based on experience, because each person has different experiences 
from each other. Kant is after something universal that precedes experience. In 
this way judgment is like reason as reason also gives the law to itself to allow us 
to act ethically. If the two things that filled Kant’s mind with awe were the “starry 
heavens above and the moral law within,” he may have added “the ‘aesthetic law’ 
within,” too.  138
Wittgenstein would later say something similar—but in parentheses—at 
the end of his Tractatus: “ethics and aesthetics are one.” In other words, both 
Beauty’s Difference Similarities between Beauty 
and Morality
Morality’s Difference
Reflective judgment seeks 
purposiveness
Purposiveness and the moral 
law are a priori and au-
tonomous
Reason seeks the moral law
No action Drop self-interest Interest in achieving a moral 
end
Freedom of imagination Freedom Freedom of will
Pleasure Universally valid yet subjective Action/Choice
 Attribution goes to Michael Howard, my thesis advisor, for the following observation. 138
Kant’s term “awe” could refer to aesthetic experience, possibly of the sublime. In either case 
Kant’s famous sentence (from the Critique of Practical Reason) here encapsulates the entire aim 
of the third critique. His aesthetic experience is the awakening to both knowledge (the starry 
heavens above) and ethics (the moral law within). It underlies both.
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beauty and the good belong to the realm of value rather than fact. Likewise, 
beauty is synthetic a priori rather than synthetic a posteriori. 
But the difference between morality and beauty is, where reflective judg-
ment reflects on purposiveness, reason reflects on the moral law. In both cases, 
though, they please immediately. That is, they’re autonomous (internal and free) 
rather than heteronomous (external and gratifying).
2. The beautiful pleases without interest. Like morality, we drop our 
self-interest in moments of the beautiful. But the difference is, in beauty there’s 
no desire to act but in morality there’s interest in achieving a moral end. In morali-
ty, though, this kind of interest isn’t a gratifying kind of interest the way “delight” 
is.
3. The beautiful frees our imagination and understanding. In other 
words, in the beautiful we experience a freedom that’s similar to the freedom un-
derlying the categorical imperative. Said still another way, when we free our-
selves from self-interest, we become freer human beings. The difference is, 
where the freedom of the will is in harmony with the universal moral laws of rea-
son in morality, it’s the imagination that’s free, in accord with understanding in the 
beautiful and with reason (after a conflict) in the sublime. Also, purposiveness is 
free.
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4. The beautiful is valid for every human even though it’s also sub-
jective. Similarly, the moral law of reason is universal and valid for every human, 
as the categorical imperative is universal but the choice is always a subjective 
one. The difference is, what’s universal in beauty is pleasure and what’s univer-
sal in morality is the moral action and choice.
The beautiful, then, operates like morality. Even more, the beautiful pre-
pares us for a moral state-of-mind. Disinterested interest puts aside self-gratifica-
tion in the same way that following the categorical imperative does. In other 
words, beauty excites us, but in a way analogous with a moral state-of-mind. 
The famous image from Plato’s Symposium comes to mind here. Socrates 
quotes Diotima saying a youth begins life lusting after beautiful bodies. But if 
Eros leads him right, in a step-by-step fashion, he begins to see the beauty of 
one body is brother to the beauty of other bodies. When he realizes that, he 
stops trying to “get” one body and begins to value The Beautiful underlying all 
beautiful bodies instead. As Plato says, this gives “birth to ideas as will make 
young men better. The result is that our lover will be forced to gaze at the beauty 
of activities and laws,”  the realm of ethics. Kant seems to say a similar thing. 139
After a person takes the step from wanting to possess a “body” for his own self-
gratification towards seeking the Beautiful itself, he’s prepared to take the next 
step into the moral realm.  
 Plato, Symposium, 210c in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. 139
Hutchinson,  Symposium trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 492-493.
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Disinterested interest “pays attention to” the sensible realm without need-
ing to self-gratify. This allows us to transition from the realm of sense to the su-
persensible realm of morality “without too violent a leap,”  as Kant says. Once 140
again, beauty in nature and in fine art produce a mind-state we can take into our 
relationships, as well as our polity.
D. Implications of “Beauty as Symbol of Morality”
Ted Cohen draws a fascinating implication in his essay, “Why Beauty is a 
Symbol of Morality.” His question: “why is beauty a symbol of morality and not the 
other way around?”  Before I get into his answer, let me give a quick backdrop 141
to his question. 
Kant’s philosophical aesthetics is rare. Cohen says in general, philoso-
phies of art and beauty are preoccupied with the relationship between beauty 
and morality. Philosophers usually reduce beauty to morality, i.e., beauty is really 
a moral good. We see this in Plato, Hume, Collingwood, Tolstoy. Less common 
are philosophers who reduce morality to an aesthetic experience, such as Niet-
zsche, Dewey, and to a certain extent Heidegger. But rarest is the philosopher 
who doesn’t reduce one to the other—who sees morality and beauty come to-
gether. Aristotle and Kant are representatives.  142
 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 225, section 59.140
 Ted Cohen, Why Beauty Is A Symbol Of Morality,” in Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, Ted 141
Cohen and Paul Guyer, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, 222.
 Ibid., 221.142
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So, if that’s true, then why is beauty a symbol of morality for Kant, and why 
isn’t morality a symbol of beauty? 
I’ll put Cohen’s answer in the following format: 
1. Moral judgments are indeterminate, even to one’s self. Freedom has no 
“marks”—so, there’s no concrete way to represent good will directly. 
2. Aesthetic judgments can be known to one’s self through disinterested 
pleasure. And a beautiful object has “marks,” but it’s undetermined by a concept.
Conclusion: Therefore, a beautiful object (known but indeterminate) can 
indirectly represent a good will (unknown and indeterminate). But a good will (un-
known and indeterminate) has no “marks” to symbolize beauty with. 
Let me unpack that. It may offer the final hint to how beauty binds Kant’s 
critical philosophy together.
1. Moral judgments are indeterminate.  
Morality is a matter of will.  Our will acts in pursuit of external ends—to 143
realize an effect. So, how can we know if an end is good? According to Kant, if 
the will is truly good then both the means and the end will be good. But how is 
that possible? Either the good end doesn’t lie outside the good will (i.e., they’re 
the same) or there is no such thing as an unqualified good will. 
Kant believes there is moral reality and that there is an unqualified good 
will. But in that case, a good end can’t lie outside the good will. This sounds 
strange but if there is such a thing as an unqualified good end, it would have to 
 Ibid., 227.143
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be a good will willing itself. The ends and the means wouldn’t lie outside the 
good. The good will would will to will itself.  In that view, a good end has no 144
conditions. And again, an end doesn’t lie outside an absolutely good will.
How could we ever find a will like this? In the real world, the end of every 
living being is outside of itself—every will pursues external ends. True, Kant 
would say. We can never have a direct experience of good will in the sensible 
realm. That’s why morality (or the unqualified good will) needs a symbol. Without 
a symbol, we would have no concrete way to experience what a good will is 
like.145
Here’s another question Kant asks about moral action. How do we judge 
whether a moral action is truly good? The short answer is, we can’t. To judge a 
moral action we must know what the motive (or will) of that agent was. But it gets 
worse. We can’t even know our own motives. Our own motives and intentions are 
opaque to us, unknown—much the way Freud thought our motives are unclear to 
ourselves, buried deep in our unconscious.  Kant says morality has an “objec146 -
tive necessity”—we have to assume absolute freedom to act morally—but can 
never know absolute freedom itself.  If a person acts out of the moral law, their 147
will becomes free. But we can never judge if a person’s act is truly moral because 
we can’t see other people’s wills, their motives, or even our own. 
 Ibid., 230.144
 Ibid.145
 Ibid., 233.146
 Ibid., 227.147
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Freedom, then, isn’t a concept that can be known like “that’s a tree.” Free-
dom is an idea that’s forever unknown to us. Another way of saying this is, con-
cepts have concrete “marks,” but ideas have no marks. An idea remains indeter-
minate (non-sensible) always. The intuition “tree” can be subsumed under the 
concept “tree,” but no sensible object can be subsumed under an idea like free-
dom. An idea has no instance—so, we can only present it indirectly as a symbol. 
Enter beautiful objects.148
2. Aesthetic judgments are indeterminate yet known
Moral judgments have an “objective necessity” but are unknown. Aesthetic 
judgments have a “subjective necessity” and can be known. This is great news. 
Beauty isn’t a property of an object but a feeling in the subject. We can determine 
beauty by how I feel towards an object (do I feel disinterested pleasure?) and 
whether that feeling coincides with the “idea” of a “universal voice.”149
But we can’t say, “this rose is beautiful” in the moment because then we 
would be conceptualizing the rose. In the moment we can only feel disinterested 
pleasure. That leads to an even better piece of news. No concept can be applied 
to the beautiful.  The word “beautiful” is a concept. Why is that even better 150
news?
A beautiful object appears to us like an object of knowledge does because 
(unlike freedom) both have concrete “marks.” Yet unlike an object of knowledge, 
 Ibid., 233.148
 Ibid., 224.149
 Ibid., 223.150
 127
a beautiful object isn’t determined by a concept. With a beautiful object, we now 
have something like a bridge between phenomena and noumena. We have a di-
rect, sensible object that’s also undetermined. 
Now, Kant has one more thing to say about how we can determine 
whether something is beautiful. We also know something is beautiful when it has 
the form of purposiveness. 
An object is purposive when it could be known as or used for some pur-
pose but we don’t know it or use it. For example, we could use a beautifully craft-
ed sword in battle, but in a moment of beauty we don’t. That moment of beauty is 
like an unqualified good will that doesn’t pursue an external end outside itself. 
So, a beautiful object is like good will. We experience what a good (free) will is 
like in our experiences of beauty.
3. Therefore, beauty symbolizes good will
So to ask Cohen’s question again: why can beauty symbolize morality, but 
morality can’t symbolize beauty? 
A good (free) will can’t be known—even our own motives are opaque to 
ourselves. Freedom is an idea. It has no concrete marks for understanding to de-
termine. A beautiful object, on the other hand, does have marks—and we can 
know beauty through our feelings, even if understanding can’t conceptualize 
beauty. Beauty is undetermined like freedom yet it appears to us in the concrete 
as if it could be determined. So, freedom can’t symbolize morality because it 
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can’t be presented directly. But beauty can symbolize morality because it ap-
pears as an object that’s both present to us directly and free.151
Cohen asks one more question at the end of his essay. If beauty is a sym-
bol of morality, is beauty like good will itself or is beauty like having good will? Is it 
meeting good will or having good will? 
Cohen argues, both. He cites Kant’s moral theory as his rationale. Kant’s 
moral theory (especially in the second “Humanity formulation” of the categorial 
imperative ) covers respect for another and respect for one’s self. So in beauty, 152
we feel respect for an object as something to reflect on (not used) and we feel 
disinterested interest in ourselves. 
So, we find a parallel of the moral experience in the experience of beauty. 
Not only that, but Cohen notices that Kant says beauty is THE symbol of morality. 
That is, only the experience of beauty stands for the moral experience. Why?
Once again, because freedom is indeterminate and unknown it can never 
represent the beautiful. But because beauty is indeterminate and known, we can 
experience what it’s like to have a good will and to meet good will. Only an aes-
thetic judgment of beauty offers that kind of experience.
We’re now in a position to answer Kant’s overarching question: how does 
beauty resolve the dualism in his philosophy?  
 Ibid., 233.151
 Second “Humanity Formula”: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 152
your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at 
the same time as an end.” -Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER 6: UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY 
We can engage an object in three ways: for gratification, for knowledge, 
and for action.  We can drink a glass of cold water on a hot day and take sen153 -
sory pleasure in it. We can determine what kind of thing water is and gain knowl-
edge about it. We can use water as an action to feed plants, provide for a family, 
community, and members of our species who don’t have access to any. 
But in an aesthetic judgment, Kant eliminates all three ways. In the beauti-
ful, we’re not gratified. We don’t determine an object to gain knowledge about it. 
We don’t use an object for some purpose. Yet at the same time a judgment of 
beauty incorporates elements of all three. We feel pleasure but it’s disinterested 
pleasure. We see an object as if it could be determined and known but we don’t. 
We could use the object for some purpose but we don’t. This isn’t surprising as 
Kant defined the beautiful in four paradoxes, or unities of opposites. 
So, here’s one answer to how beauty may resolve the antagonism be-
tween freedom and determinism. From a “theoretical” perspective, we see the 
natural world as determined by natural laws. From a “practical” perspective, we 
assume free will. From either one of those perspectives, theory or practice, we 
see dualism and an antagonism. But from the perspective of the beautiful, we 
experience freedom and determinism together at once, as a unity.
 Cohen, 230.153
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Let me put that in another way.
In an aesthetic judgment, we don’t apply a concept (i.e., a label) to an ob-
ject. That enables a beautiful object to belong to sensible determinism and su-
persensible freedom. The object (obviously) belongs to the sensible realm be-
cause it appears to us as a phenomenon. It has “marks,” it’s concrete, as if it 
were a determined object. But when we look at that object as beautiful we don’t 
determine it as a concept. The object becomes purposive. 
In the last chapter we saw how Kant thinks a “purposive” object symbol-
izes morality. That is, a beautiful object symbolizes good (free) will—what’s be-
yond appearance or the supersensible, where freedom resides. But that doesn’t 
mean we see free will itself in a beautiful object. It only means we experience 
freedom indirectly, by analogy. We experience freedom in ourselves when our 
cognitive faculties are thrown into free play, and we meet freedom because the 
beautiful object is free from determinism. The beautiful object allows us to taste 
what freedom may be like even though the object is sensible and could be de-
termined.
That’s why the term “purposive” is so crucial to Kant’s aesthetics. Purpo-
sive means a beautiful object can be used as an object with purpose in the phe-
nomenal world or it can be known. But when we see an object as beautiful we 
refrain from using it or knowing it. A purposive object then becomes like morality 
where we respect a thing as an end rather than as a means. As purposive, a 
beautiful object stands for both the sensible and the supersensible realms at the 
same time. We experience freedom and determinism together.
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But what does this mean in the real world, and how is this even possible?
One answer might be that freedom and nature share the same substrate, so an 
aesthetic judgment is responding to that. Kant says this in Introduction IX: 
the ground that determines the causality of things of nature . . . at the 
same time also in unison with the formal principle of the laws of reason—
a ground which, while its possibility is impenetrable, may still be com-
pletely cleared of the charge of contradiction that it is alleged to have.  
Kant applies a footnote to that sentence. He says:
One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction of 
the causality of nature from that through freedom . . . is easily avoided . . . 
The resistance is not between nature and freedom, but between the for-
mer (nature) as phenomenon and the effects of the latter (freedom) as 
phenomena in the world of sense. . . . the causality of freedom is the 
causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom . . .
If my reading of those two passages is correct, then the antagonism be-
tween freedom and determinism isn’t real. The “contradiction” rises from our per-
spective, from our being unable to access the supersensible realm. Let me give 
an image to illustrate what I think Kant means.
We see a horse as it appears to us, as the “phenomenon” of a horse. But 
the horse is also a thing-in-itself, more than its appearance. We can’t see the 
horse-in-itself because we’re limited by our understanding. That doesn’t mean 
there’s a contradiction between horse-as-appearance and horse-as-thing-in-it-
self. If the illusion arises, it’s only because our understanding is limited by the in-
tuitions of time and space, and other a priori categories of understanding. In oth-
er words, the dualism has to do with us, not with reality. But there’s hope. In our 
experience of the beautiful, we’re given a hint that the horse is more than its con-
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cept, more than mere appearance. We see the horse as possibly determined and 
also undetermined—as a sensible object but also as an end-in-itself.
Now, Kant says something else in the above passage. He says the cause 
(or “law”) of freedom is also the cause (or “law”) of nature. This may be a contro-
versial reading of the passage, but if the moral law is also the law of freedom, 
then wouldn’t that also mean the law of nature is the moral law? Again, only if my 
reading is correct, there may be a parallel between that passage and Shaftes-
bury. For Shaftesbury, the natural law harmonizes the various organisms into a 
whole in the same way the moral law harmonizes persons into a community. Like 
Plato’s Demiurge stamping a structure modeled after The Good onto chaos, na-
ture may be determined but its natural laws come from someplace higher, the 
moral law. That’s just speculation. But maybe aesthetic judgment responds to 
truth (order) referring us deeper to its roots, to the good?
That may be risky to say, but this is my point. If the sensible substrate 
shares the same substrate as the supersensible realm, then freedom and deter-
minism aren’t antagonistic to each other, they’re parts of the same reality. The 
horse is free but also abides by natural laws. A piece of music is determined by 
number, but also sings with freedom. In fact, the stronger the structure, the more 
freely music can sing (we can’t dance across a rickety bridge). Determinism and 
freedom aren’t dichotomous but one. The beautiful tells us there’s more below 
the horse’s appearance than meets the eye, and there’s more below an artwork’s 
appearance than meets the eye. Appearance vs. thing-in-itself aren’t separate 
forces but poles on a continuum. 
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So, the “unity of opposites” that is reality might make our experience of the 
beautiful possible. That unity isn’t abstract speculation. Maybe Kant wants to say 
that beauty is a concrete experience hinting at the possible existence of freedom, 
a freedom not divided from nature. And every one of us can experience beauty. 
The unity of philosophy may mean something else in the real world, be-
sides a revelation into the nature of reality. It might also reveal something about 
our humanity. 
Taking his three critiques together, Kant seems to think basic humanity 
shows itself in three activities:  to know (or to make sense of things), to influ154 -
ence things (through action), and to see beauty (which can be communicated  
universally as art through a craft). Aesthetic judgment is an emblem of all three.  
Here again we could possibly see the influence of Shaftesbury on Kant. 
Common sense—in Kant’s narrow meaning of “aesthetic instinct”—could 
be seen as the ground of humanity. That is, we first see unity, the whole. From 
that vision of beauty we can now go in one of those three directions. We can de-
termine an object for knowledge. We can act in ways that are respectful to our-
selves and others. And we can open ourselves to the “ideas” of “reason” to cre-
ate artworks that in turn remind the rest of humanity of the beautiful. Ideas, con-
cepts, and imagination interact with each other in our common sense.
The following graph may help review what we’ve discussed throughout 
this thesis, and illustrate what Kant’s unity might look like. 
 Cohen, 235. Cohen originally said he “believe(s) Kant thought essential humanity 154
shows in two things we do: make sense of objects and act to influence objects.” But after reading 
Kant’s section on fine art in the third critique, I can’t see why Kant wouldn’t add making art.
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Table 6.1. The Unity of Philosophy 
Determinism - 
Looking at an object
Aesthetics - 
Looking at an object
Freedom - 
Looking at an “object”
Phenomenon as having an 
External Purpose
Phenomenon as Purposive Noumenon as having an 
Internal Purpose
Appears Thing appears but as if a 
thing-in-itself
Thing-in-itself
Sensible Sensible yet undetermined 
(like the supersensible)
Supersensible
See external object in nature 
literally—as concept or use
See external object as art—
without concept or usefulness
See no external object—re-
ferred to freedom (within)
Purpose as a law to determine 
an object, in terms of function 
or concept
Purposiveness as an object 
that could be determined as a 
concept or a function; and 
also purposiveness as an end 
an object wills for but which 
we can’t see
Purpose as an end which the 
will strives for which we can’t 
see
Understanding -
In our minds
Judgment - 
In our minds
Reason - 
In our minds
Understanding applies the 
categories and concepts of 
our Cognitive Powers to 
know
Judgment applies the Feeling 
of Pleasure or Displeasure 
to appreciate—it especially 
uses disinterested interest, 
which can be known to us, but 
which concepts don’t apply, so 
object remains undetermined
Reason applies Desire (or 
Free Will), which can’t be 
known, to act 
Understanding uses a priori 
principle of Natural Law
Judgment uses a priori prin-
ciple of Purposiveness
Reason uses a priori princi-
ple of Final End (or moral 
law)
The Unity
Looking at a concrete object 
with marks that could be 
known or used…
…but not knowing the object 
or using it…
…is like seeing an object as 
an end-in-itself, and it’s like 
having a free will that needs 
nothing
Therefore, understanding (to 
know)…
…can interact with… …Will (which can’t be known)
They can reciprocally 
influence each other
Responding to the unity of 
appearance and will
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In fact, in the final section of “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” section 60, 
Kant suggests the beautiful (and fine art) can bridge “the more cultured and ruder 
sections of the community” together. He says the beautiful communicates univer-
sally and touches each person’s common sense. In the process we would edu-
cate “the universal feeling of sympathy” and learn to “communicate universally 
one’s inmost self.” If I’m not off in reading Kant that beauty is the ground of our 
humanity, then that could mean beauty helps our humanity flourish.
In a world where “dualisms” in thinking can tear communities apart; in a 
world where sometimes we feel there’s nothing higher than the sensible realm; in 
a world where concrete “jungles” don’t always allow for aesthetic experiences, 
Kant’s argument has relevance. Beauty is important. By relishing nature and cre-
ating artworks of beauty, we can help bring communities together, respect nature 
as an end,  open the imagination to play, and give a person hope there exists a 155
purpose higher than what our senses can see.  
 I may develop this further in another paper.155
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